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I. INTRODUCTION 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,1 signed into law on 
March 23, 2010, promises to increase access to health care for millions 
of Americans, but does not entirely resolve the continuing problem of 
cost.  The new law will swiftly and dramatically alter the market 
dynamics for people who need health insurance, making it much easier 
for them to purchase coverage; yet, it fails to create any mechanism to 
absolutely curtail government or private sector spending.  The cost of 
the healthcare system presents legal and social challenges requiring the 
attention of legal scholars, particularly in a manner tailored to address 
the challenges that the changing system presents. 
The U.S. economy has absorbed escalating healthcare costs for 
decades, even as the country has historically failed to provide access to 
necessary care for many of its citizens, doing far worse than many 
countries that spend far less.2  In 2009, the cost of the healthcare system 
in the United States was about $2.5 trillion, up 5.7% from the previous 
year3—17.3% of the entire Gross Domestic Product.4  By 2019, this cost 
is projected to reach $4.5 trillion,5 19.3% of the Gross Domestic 
Product.6  Costs continue to rise far above what any other country 
spends per capita.7  Lack of access to health care can be lethal,8 and 
 1. Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010). 
 2. According to the United States Census Bureau, 15% of Americans did not have health 
insurance in 2008, more than 46 million people.  Press Release, U.S. Census Bureau, Income, Poverty 
and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2008 (Sept. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.census.gov/newsroom/releases/archives/income_wealth/cb09-141.html.  See also CARMEN 
DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE 
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2008, 57–67 (2009), available at http://www.census.gov/prod/ 
2009pubs/p60-236.pdf. 
 3. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
NATIONAL HEALTH EXPENDITURE PROJECTIONS 2009–2019 (2009), available at https://www.cms.gov/ 
NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/proj2009.pdf [hereinafter NHEP]. 
 4. Id.  In 2008, healthcare expenditures were 16.2% of gross domestic products (GDP).  Id.  
This 1.1% increase in percentage of GDP spent on health care is the greatest single year increase in U.S. 
history.  Id. 
 5. Id. tbl.3. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Press Release, World Health Org., World Health Organization Assesses the World’s Health 
Systems (2010), http://www.who.int/whr/2000/media_centre/press_release/en/index.html.  See also 
WORLD HEALTH ORG., THE WORLD HEALTH REPORT 2000: HEALTH SYSTEMS: IMPROVING 
PERFORMANCE 155 (2000), available at http://www.who.int/whr/2000/en/whr00_en.pdf (ranking the 
United States first in spending per capita among 191 countries) [hereinafter WHO REPORT].  As one can 
easily imagine, the WHO 2000 ranking is subject to criticism.  See Carl Bialik, Ill-Conceived Ranking 
Makes for Unhealthy Debate: In the Wrangle Over Health Care, a Low Rating for the U.S. System 
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there is cause for hope that the increased access promised by the Patient 
Protection Act will go a long way toward reducing these preventable 
harms.  However, while increased access will improve many aspects of 
the current system, including the overall value it acquires for dollars 
spent, the Patient Protection Act is not likely, by itself, to end current 
cost concerns. 
Costs place an extraordinary, distorting pressure on the healthcare 
system.  While the political system dictates the content of laws, cost 
often shapes how these laws are implemented.  This Article looks 
closely at this dynamic in the Medicare system, but also attempts to 
create a blueprint for further critical study of the broader problem’s 
effect on the institutions that health law seeks to regulate.  This is 
especially important as the United States creates a massive regulatory 
framework to implement the new healthcare laws.  There are flaws in 
the current healthcare system, driven into being by unspoken cost 
concerns, which have long gone unremarked upon by legal scholars.  A 
new regulatory framework that fails to take this dynamic into account 
risks entrenching the same problems—its authors carrying the sins of 
this generation into the next. 
A driving force in increasing medical expenditures is the cost of new 
medical technologies, drugs, and procedures provided to persons who 
have health insurance.9  People with insurance consume an 
extraordinary amount of healthcare resources per person, far more than 
is reflected in the simple per capita cost of health care, which averages 
costs across all persons, insured and uninsured alike.  This needs to be 
limited.  Nevertheless, the clamorous public debate over health care 
leading to passage of the new healthcare legislation beyond calling for 
increased studies about efficacy and waste was silent about setting limits 
Keeps Emerging Despite Evident Shortcomings in Study, WALL ST. J., Oct. 21, 2009, at A19, available 
at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125608054324397621.html. 
 8. The Institute of Medicine, in a report from 2002, found that lack of health insurance caused 
at least 18,000 deaths each year.  INST. OF MED., INSURING AMERICA’S HEALTH: PRINCIPLES AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 8 (2004).  While this study was based on data collected in 1993, an academic study 
from 2009 found that “lack of health insurance is associated with as many as 44,789 deaths per year in 
the United States.”  Andrew P. Wilper et al., Health Insurance and Mortality in US Adults, 99 AM. J. 
PUB. HEALTH 2289, 2295 (2009). 
 9. The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., U.S. Health Care Costs, http://www.kaiseredu.org/Issue-
Modules/US-Health-Care-Costs/Background-Brief.aspx (last visited Aug. 26, 2010) (citing Growth in 
Health Care Costs: Before the Comm. on the Budget U.S. Senate (2008) (statement of Peter R. Orszag, 
Dir., Cong. Budget Office)).  See also id. (“[S]pending on prescription drugs has decelerated.  Some 
analysts state that the availability of more expensive, state-of-the-art technological services and new 
drugs fuel healthcare spending not only because the development costs of these products must be 
recouped by industry but also because they generate consumer demand for more intense, costly services 
even if they are not necessarily cost-effective.” (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TECHNOLOGICAL 
CHANGE AND THE GROWTH OF HEALTH CARE SPENDING (2008))). 
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on spending for expensive new medical treatments, particularly for those 
covered by Medicare. 
The normative implications of rationing health care have been 
exhaustively discussed in academic literature from many disciplines, 
including health policy, law, philosophy, and bioethics.  While no clear 
consensus has emerged as to what the proper goals of a just system are 
(or how a society goes about achieving such a system), and while 
substantive work remains to be done in this field, there are looming 
problems in the non-ideal world that beg for the legal academy to begin 
focusing its energy in a different direction.  Given the escalating cost of 
new medical technologies, for example, the question emerges as to how 
current payment structures grapple with cost pressures in the context of 
the laws that govern them.  This form of critical analysis has a twofold 
focus, assessing both whether current laws can be utilized to reduce cost 
and whether any resulting cost reductions are legitimately achieved. 
Medicare is the single largest health care benefits provider in the 
country,10 and its decisions have a broad effect on the entire United 
States healthcare system.  In 2009, Medicare spent $507 billion,11 
covering 46 million people.12  While more than 150 million Americans 
have private insurance13 spread across many insurers, and another 33.2 
million are enrolled in Medicaid programs,14 no other single insurance 
plan covers as many people—or spends as many dollars—as Medicare. 
As Medicare’s costs spin out of control, a hidden rationing problem 
has developed where Medicare considers the cost of new treatments 
when deciding whether to cover them, but does so in an undemocratic 
way that is not transparent nor subject to direct public response.  While 
Medicare is under enormous pressure to control costs, it resorts to 
hidden rationing, because Congress has refused to give it statutory 
power to consider costs in deciding whether to cover expensive new 
medical technologies.  These important coverage decisions are made by 
the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS), a federal 
 10. Medicare is the federal program that provides medical benefits to people over the age of 
sixty-five and to the disabled.  Health Insurance for the Aged Act (Medicare Act), Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 
Stat. 286 (1965). 
 11. See NHEP, supra note 3, at 1. 
 12. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: MEDICARE AT A GLANCE 1 (2010), 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/1066-12.pdf. 
 13. JOHN HOLAHAN & ALLISON COOK, THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., CHANGES IN 
HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE, 2007–2008: EARLY IMPACT OF THE RECESSION 2 fig.1 (2009), 
available at http://www.kff.org/uninsured/upload/8004.pdf. 
 14. Id. fig.2.  Medicaid is the combined federal and state program that provides health benefits 
for those with low incomes.  See Medicaid Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, § 121(a), 79 Stat. 343 
(2008). 
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agency in the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS).  
Funding for CMS comes from two politically sensitive sources—payroll 
tax revenues allocated by Congress and premiums paid by Medicare 
recipients. 
CMS has a process by which it makes National Coverage 
Determinations (NCDs) to decide whether to cover particularly 
expensive new technologies, and the problem discussed in this Article 
occurs here.  Even as the potential cost-benefit ratio of technology can 
legally justify the issuance of an NCD, the Medicare Act prohibits cost 
to shape the actual NCD issued by CMS.  CMS often flatly denies that 
cost impacts its specific decisions,15 yet its management continually 
stresses the importance of cost control.16  As a result of these conflicting 
messages, and in light of CMS’s actual decisions, it has become an 
“open secret” in health policy that CMS considers cost when issuing 
NCDs.17 
This Article argues that Medicare needs to be changed, giving CMS 
the power and obligation to openly consider the cost of new medical 
treatments before covering them.  Doing so will yield two distinct 
benefits.  First, such a change will give CMS legitimate power to more 
effectively lower Medicare’s costs.  Unless CMS is formally empowered 
to consider costs as well as benefits of new medical treatments in its 
NCDs, the costs of Medicare undoubtedly will continue to escalate, 
which would be highly problematic for the nation.  Current projections 
reveal that without some change, Medicare alone will cost the nation 
nearly $1 trillion by 2019.18 
 15. “[T]he cost of a particular technology is not relevant in the determination of whether the 
technology improves health outcomes or should be covered for the Medicare population through an 
NCD.”  CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID, DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., GUIDANCE FOR THE 
PUBLIC, INDUSTRY AND CMS STAFF: FACTORS CMS CONSIDERS IN OPENING A NATIONAL COVERAGE 
DETERMINATION (2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/mcd/ncpc_view_document.asp?id=6.  
See also Ruth Faden & Sean Tunis, Virtual Colonoscopy: A Window Into the Challenges of Health Care 
Reform, HEALTH CARE COST MONITOR, Aug. 6, 2009, available at http://healthcarecostmonitor. 
thehastingscenter.org/ruthfaden/virtual-colonoscopy-a-window-into-the-challenges-of-health-
carereform/ (“Medicare also addressed the question of whether the higher cost . . . factored into its 
decision; it said that the costs were considered but emphasized that its decision was based on uncertainty 
about the clinical benefits.”).  The cost effectiveness of the colonoscopy at issue in this case was 
discussed extensively by people outside of CMS in response to the CMS decision, making CMS’s denial 
particularly interesting.  One is left wondering whether CMS was ignoring important cost implications 
or refusing to admit it had done so. 
 16. See infra notes 125–127 and accompanying text. 
 17. See, e.g., Philip R. Alper, Commentary, Kids’ Shoes and Death Panels: Deciding Between 
Needs and Wants is Health Care’s Impossible Task, WASH. TIMES, Feb. 10, 2010, at B04, available at 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2010/feb/10/kids-shoes-and-death-panels/ (“It is an open secret, 
however, that the more costly the claim, the more intense the scrutiny.”). 
 18. NHEP, supra note 3, at tbl.3 (predicting $978 billion by 2019). 
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The second benefit from directing CMS to openly consider these 
types of costs is that, by putting cost-benefit balancing on the table, the 
public will have an opportunity to participate in the difficult, cost-driven 
decisions CMS already makes sub rosa.19  There are distinct advantages 
to this form of public participation.  Without open debate in the face of 
the rapid increase of healthcare costs, the United States remains blind as 
to what its societal value system requires from difficult cost and access 
decisions about health care.20  To fix this, the nation must clarify the 
kinds of medical care that it believes are most fundamentally important.  
Yet, before it can do this, the nation needs to put in place effective forms 
of democratic deliberation for use in defining the values the nation 
wants its healthcare system to reflect.  Medicare is uniquely situated as 
the place to begin identifying national values regarding the costs of 
health care, both because of its sheer size and because its administrator, 
CMS, has a platform from which it can generate public discussion about 
its proposed rules through its NCD process. 
The most significant challenge in directing Medicare explicitly to 
consider the costs of particular medical treatment is the fear of revealing 
the frightening fact that Medicare is actually rationing health care in 
America and that healthcare rationing will only increase in the years 
ahead.  It may be that politicians’ fears of negative public perception 
could lead to limited political support for changing Medicare in the 
manner proposed here.  On the other hand, experience has shown that 
some politicians appear to have benefited from frankly addressing 
medical rationing.  Putting aside the politics of the matter, it is critically 
necessary to control the overall costs of the Medicare program.  Without 
a more forthright approach to rationing, the healthcare system’s massive 
projected cost increases could actually destroy the country’s economy.  
Changes in the law that effectively stop this from occurring are clearly 
in the public interest. 
Part II of this Article describes the CMS process for issuing NCDs 
and uses a case study to show how cost concerns affect the NCDs it 
issues.  This Part describes the history of the Medicare Act, particularly 
why costs were not addressed in the language of the Act, and explains 
the legal structure of the Medicare Act in the context of this history by 
focusing on the language of the Act and how it can be interpreted 
 19. Public participation takes place during the public comment period in the Medicare coverage 
process, described in Part V.B, infra. 
 20. See Allan S. Brett, “American Values” – A Smoke Screen in the Debate on Health Care 
Reform, 361 NEW ENG. J. MED. 5, 440 (2009) (an excellent discussion on both the constant use of the 
concept of “American Values” in healthcare debates and how little we truly know of what these values 
are). 
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Part II then examines the evolving process for making NCDs.  While 
CMS has made a series of failed attempts to explicitly incorporate cost 
into this process, more recently it has focused almost entirely on the 
quality of evidence it requires from applicants to justify coverage.  This 
focus, in turn, has created new cost-control problems for CMS.  Under 
the current scheme, applicants have the financial incentive to design 
studies that will receive coverage for the broadest possible population.  
Yet, CMS has the financial incentive to interpret the same data so as to 
narrow the population for which it approves coverage.  CMS’s cost-
driven interpretations of data to deny coverage are difficult to justify 
when the data are of a high quality and clearly support the applicants’ 
coverage position.  Part II concludes with a case study of the NCDs 
issued for implantable cardiac defibrillators to illustrate how the 
prohibition against considering cost distorts the NCD process. 
Part III of the Article considers the relationship between Medicare’s 
hidden rationing problem and the recent creation and dissolution of the 
Federal Coordinating Council for Comparative Effectiveness Research 
(the Coordinating Council), coupled with substantial funding recently 
directed towards cost effectiveness research (CER), arguing that CER is 
both vulnerable to being distorted by CMS for cost purposes and that 
CER’s potential value to society will be greatly increased by amending 
Medicare in the manner this Article suggests.  To enable people to 
pursue greater value for their healthcare purchases, provisions of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act strengthen the federal 
government’s commitment to funding comparative effectiveness 
research.  The value-enhancing use of this information is left almost 
entirely to consumers as the laws governing federal funding of 
comparative effectiveness research make it clear that the results of the 
research cannot be used by government agencies to create coverage 
policies for the purpose of saving money.  Part III explains how CER 
results are vulnerable to being manipulated for cost-saving purposes.  
Given the absence of a formal process for using CER for cost-saving 
purposes and how much trust is required for the public to actually adopt 
CER findings as guidance for their own medical choices, CER’s success 
depends almost entirely on transparently separating its findings from 
cost concerns, something that Medicare is currently unable to do while 
still protecting its fiscal stability. 
Part IV of the Article explores the heart of the political problem—the 
explicit rationing of health care—and argues that, counterintuitively, 
politicians should be able to survive promoting rationing and that the 
nation will benefit, therefrom.  The implementation of the Oregon 
7
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rationing structure provides an example of post-rationing political 
viability and public approval.  Part V offers a proposal for amending the 
Medicare Act allowing the cost of new medical treatments to be 
addressed openly and directly. 
II. THE MEDICARE PROBLEM: HIDING COST IN COVERAGE 
CONSIDERATIONS 
CMS is the federal agency that administers the Medicare program 
(Medicare), which provides health insurance for those over sixty-five 
years of age and for the disabled receiving Social Security benefits.  It is 
responsible for providing healthcare benefits to roughly 45 million 
people, the majority of whom are over sixty-five.21  Medicare spent 
$507 billion in 2009, which is 13% of the federal budget for that year.22 
Medicare is an expensive program, and CMS’s relationship with cost-
based rationing of health care within Medicare is complex.  CMS does 
not have legislative power to refuse coverage for medical treatments 
because of how much they cost, but functions within a budget set by 
Congress.  Congress, in turn, raises revenue to pay for what Medicare 
covers.  Raising revenue creates its own set of problems, such as the 
political cost of raising taxes.  This situation creates an incentive for 
CMS to control cost without appearing to violate the law, and provides 
Congress with an incentive to loosely examine CMS’s cost-saving 
decisions. 
CMS has championed efficacy studies and demanded evidence of the 
highest probative value to support its coverage decisions.23  CMS 
supports using a “gold standard”24 of medical evidence.  To do this, 
CMS ranks the quality of clinical studies based on numerous, coherent, 
and sensible criteria that help assess the reliability of the data 
generated.25  For example, studies where doctors do not know which 
 21. BARBARA S. KLEES ET AL., DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., BRIEF SUMMARIES OF 
MEDICARE & MEDICAID 7 (2009), available at http://www.cms.gov/MedicareMedicaidStatSupp/ 
downloads/2009BriefSummaries.pdf. 
 22. THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., MEDICARE: A PRIMER 13 (2009), available at 
http://www.kff.org/medicare/upload/7615-02.pdf [hereinafter PRIMER] (citing OFFICE OF MGMT. & 
BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009 MID-SESSION REVIEW: BUDGET OF 
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT (2008)). 
 23. See Medicare Program: Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,124 (May 
16, 2000). 
 24. See generally STEFAN TIMMERMANS & MARC BERG, THE GOLD STANDARD: THE 
CHALLENGE OF EVIDENCE-BASED MEDICINE AND STANDARDIZATION IN HEALTH CARE (2003). 
 25. CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., 
MEDICARE COVERAGE ADVISORY COMMITTEE OPERATIONS AND METHODOLOGY SUBCOMMITTEE; 
PROCESS FOR EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS AND COMMITTEE OPERATIONS 3–6 (2006), available at 
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patient is taking a placebo and which is taking a new medicine are 
considered more reliable than anecdotal reports of one doctor’s 
experience with a patient. 
However, when faced with applications for coverage of new and 
expensive medical treatments, CMS’s need to control cost makes it 
difficult for it to rely entirely on the highest quality data when making 
its decisions.  Medical costs continue to rise at an astonishing rate26 with 
new treatments driving this increase.27  CMS must somehow take cost 
into account, and when this problem arises, it is actually the high quality 
evidence in support of expensive treatments presenting the biggest 
problem.  Since CMS cannot explicitly consider cost-based criteria when 
making coverage decisions, it can only control cost by interpreting data 
in a manner that supports a cost-limiting coverage decision.  This leads 
to CMS making decisions where the role of cost is hidden and its 
interpretations of applicants’ data are suspect. 
It may appear harsh to claim that CMS’s NCDs are unreliable because 
of hidden cost concerns that may influence their ultimate decisions.  In 
light of CMS’s support of high quality data, particularly in the current, 
highly sensitive political environment, such a claim must be made 
cautiously.  This Article justifies doing so by explaining how the law 
and regulations governing Medicare constrain how CMS makes 
coverage decisions, supported by concrete, specific examples of how 
those constraints have led to this result.  This Article does not seek to 
portray a government agency that is corrupt or malicious.  Rather, CMS 
is an agency motivated by stewardship of the Medicare program and 
protection of its members.  The problem lies in the legal and political 
conditions within which CMS must function, and which directly 
promote data manipulation.  These structures and conditions must 
change. 
A. A Short History of Medicare and Cost 
The United States is far behind most other developed countries in 
terms of developing a system of universal health care.28  In truth, our 
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/FACA/Downloads/recommendations.pdf. 
 26. NHEP, supra note 3, at 1 (indicating that the average rate of healthcare spending is expected 
to increase by 6.1% a year into the foreseeable future, while growth in the overall economy is expected 
to be 4.4% per year). 
 27. See The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 9. 
 28. An excellent comparison of different countries’ systems can be found in HEALTH CARE 
COVERAGE DETERMINATIONS: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE STUDY (Timothy Jost ed., 2004).  
See also The Henry J. Kaiser Family Found., supra note 9. 
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“system” is a series of imperfect safety nets.29  Medicare, enacted in 
1965, was one of the first healthcare safety nets created by the federal 
government. 
Before the passage of Medicare, people over the age of sixty-five 
found it difficult to acquire private health insurance.30  The poverty rate 
for the elderly was quite high, and without insurance, illness was often 
financially devastating.31  Medicare sought to address this problem and 
has been very successful in doing so.  More than 99% of those over 
sixty-five are currently insured in the United States.32  The poverty rate 
for the elderly has been reduced from 35.2 % in 1959 to 10.2% in 
2003.33 
While successful in increasing access to health care for the elderly, 
Medicare was the result of numerous compromises among the various 
interested parties and those compromises resulted in some structural 
problems that have contributed to out-of-control spending.34  The cost of 
Medicare now threatens to undermine the increased access that the 
original program provided so successfully.  The compromises in 
Medicare were meant to address stakeholder concerns that: (1) 
government, rather than physicians, would control healthcare choices; 
(2) hospitals and doctors would be forced to accept low payments due to 
government bargaining power; and (3) the elderly would be refused 
treatment or provided a lower level of care due to their status as 
Medicare beneficiaries.35  Cost does not appear to have been a pressing 
concern, which makes sense when one considers that total national 
expenditures for health care, as measured by the federal government in 
 29. Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (2006) (providing coverage for those over 65 and 
the disabled); Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396 et seq. (2006) (providing coverage for the poor); 
Emergency Medical Treatment & Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (2006) (requiring 
emergency departments to stabilize patients in emergency situations, though the patients bear financial 
responsibility for the care provided). 
 30. PRIMER, supra note 22, at 1 (“Prior to 1965, roughly half of all seniors lacked medical 
insurance.”). 
 31. See Press Release, Patrick Leahy, Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy on the Motion to 
Proceed to H.R. 3590, The “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” (November 21, 2009), 
available at http://leahy.senate.gov/press/press_releases/release/?id=62ef39d7-76f2-4621-b7b8-
f1d959433ef3 (stating that more than one in three elderly people lived in poverty prior to the passage of 
Medicare). 
 32. James W. Mold et al., Who Are the Uninsured Elderly in the United States, 52 J. AM. 
GERIATRICS SOC’Y 601, 601–06 (2004) (publishing the results of a 2000 study which found 350,000 
uninsured people over the age of sixty-five). 
 33. DENAVAS-WALT ET AL., supra note 2, at 50 tbl.B-2. 
 34. See Jacqueline Fox, Medicare Should, but Cannot, Consider Cost: Legal Impediments to a 
Sound Policy, 53 BUFF. L. REV. 577, 586–96 (2005); see also THEODORE R. MARMOR, THE POLITICS OF 
MEDICARE (2d ed. 2000). 
 35. Fox, supra note 34, at 595. 
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1965, were $42 billion, compared with expenditures of $2.57 trillion 
projected for 2010.36 
In order to satisfy critics and, primarily, to gain the support of the 
American Medical Association and similar lobbying groups, Medicare 
was designed to encourage providers to treat the elderly to protect both 
the pricing structure for the provision of medical care in effect at the 
time and the right of physicians to make decisions for their individual 
patients.37  Whatever the merits of these choices, they are now widely 
understood to have created a payment system that had an inflationary 
impact on the cost of the United States healthcare system.38 
B. How the “Reasonable and Necessary” Language of Medicare 
Prevents CMS from Considering Costs 
Medicare is administered by CMS, which is an arm of the Department 
of Health and Human Services (HHS), which itself is an agency in the 
executive branch.  CMS gets its legal power from the Medicare enabling 
act, entitled The Medicare Act, passed by Congress in 1965 and 
amended numerous times in subsequent years.39  The language of the 
original Medicare Act specifies Medicare’s scope of coverage: “No 
payment may be made under [Medicare] for any expense incurred for 
items or services which . . . are not reasonable and necessary for the 
diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury or to improve the functioning 
of a malformed body member.”40  This language has remained 
unchanged since 1965 and is the language that dictates how Medicare 
evaluates expensive new medical technologies and procedures. 
The meaning of Medicare’s “reasonable and necessary” language is 
extremely important.  Because this language has never been amended, it 
is the meaning in 1965 that matters.  “Reasonable and necessary” is not 
included in any printed official legislative history related to that section 
of the Act.  The absence of reported debate is not surprising since the 
language was inserted in Medicare only as the final work was done 
 36. Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., National Health Expenditures Historical and 
Projections 1965–2019, available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/nationalhealthexpenddata/ 
03_nationalhealthaccountsprojected.asp (follow “NHE Historical and projections, 1965–2019 (ZIP, 32 
KB)” hyperlink) (last visited Aug. 29, 2010).  See also Christopher Chantrill, Total Budgeted 
Government Spending Expenditure, http://www.usgovernmentspending.com/year1965_0.html (last 
visited Aug. 26, 2009) (showing that the entire federal budget for 1965 was $118 billion and thus 
suggesting that the cost of health care was not as worrisome then as it is now). 
 37. Fox, supra note 34, at 595. 
 38. Id. at 596–97. 
 39. Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395 et seq. (2006). 
 40. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1)(A) (2006) (“Exclusions from coverage”). 
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drafting the law for this extensively negotiated program.41  The language 
was taken from a health insurance policy that AETNA offered to federal 
government employees at that time.42  The only change in language 
from the AETNA policy was that AETNA refused payment for services 
not “reasonable or necessary,” whereas the Medicare program specified 
coverage for services that were “reasonable and necessary.”43 
In the 1960s, state courts heard numerous cases requiring judges to 
interpret close variants of the statutory language, as it was the typical 
language of fee-for-service health insurance contracts at that time.44  
These courts consistently interpreted the health insurance contract 
language as giving broad discretion to the recommendation of the 
covered person’s treating physician.45  If the treating physician 
determined that a course of treatment was necessary, it appeared to the 
courts to be presumptively reasonable that the insurance company 
should pay for it.46  Courts were reluctant to enter into physician’s 
decision-making, and they saw nothing in the contracts that allowed 
insurance companies to participate in that process either.47 
Soon after passage of the Medicare Act, escalating medical costs 
became a national concern.48  When Medicare was originally written, 
these costs were still relatively low, in part due to a limited range of 
available medical treatments.  As modern science expanded treatment 
options, it became clear that medical spending could be theoretically 
limitless.49  In addition, Medicare’s initial reimbursement rates had an 
inflationary effect, leading to an explosion of spending for hospital 
infrastructures.50  Medicare’s initial cost projections quickly proved to 
be significantly underestimated.  In 1965, it projected that the program 
would cost $3.1 billion (in 1965 dollars) to administer for 1970.51  By 
1969, that estimate was revised to $5 billion (in 1969 dollars), an 
increase of projected cost in raw dollars of more than 60% in four 
 41. Fox, supra note 34, at 591–93. 
 42. Id. at 594. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 594–95. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 596. 
 49. Id. 
 50. S. REP. NO. 89-404, at 36 (1965), as reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1943, 1977.  In an 
effort to garner political support from hospitals, the Medicare Act included generous hospital 
reimbursement rates that were meant to include infrastructure costs. 
 51. S. REP. NO. 91-1431, at 138 (1970). 
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years.52  This rapid increase in spending for medical care was not 
limited to spending on Medicare recipients, and new structures for 
providing health insurance in the United States were created in response 
to the problem.53  Some form of managed care gradually became the 
norm for most types of medical insurance while Medicare remained 
bound to the language of traditional contracts of a dif 54
In addition to rising costs, a significant part of changing the health 
insurance culture apart from Medicare was the enactment of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), which became law 
in 1974.55  ERISA is an employee benefit law that regulates employer-
based pension and health plans.  Most importantly here, ERISA pre-
empts most state lawsuits related to such plans,56 requires benefit law 
suits to be brought in federal court, and does not allow any damages to 
be awarded to patients beyond the value of the medical care in dispute.57  
Due to ERISA preemption, the majority of health insurance contracts are 
administered without fear of significant liability exposure because most 
people in this country receive their health insurance through employer-
sponsored ERISA plans.58  This allows plan administrators to take an 
aggressive, cost-saving stance in benefits decisions without the risk of 
being held responsible for any damages that a wrongful denial might 
cause.  The state courts from the 1960s, discussed supra, protected the 
right of the doctor to determine what a patient needed, and ERISA has 
excluded these courts from most health insurance coverage disputes.  
Arguably, ERISA preemption is one of the few significant healthcare 
cost-reducing components of our healthcare system.59 
As the health insurance industry broadly adopted concepts from 
managed care, insurers changed the language in their contracts to reflect 
this, reserving for themselves increasing authority to decide which 
 52. Id. 
 53. The federal government enacted the Health Maintenance Organization (HMO) Act in 1973, 
which encouraged the creation of these new forms of health insurance.  Health Maintenance 
Organization Act of 1973, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e et seq. (2006). 
 54. Gail A. Jensen et al., The New Dominance of Managed Care: Insurance Trends in the 1990s, 
16 HEALTH AFF. 125 (1997). 
 55. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq. 
(2006). 
 56. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2006). 
 57. § 1001. 
 58. See THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND. & HEALTH RES. & EDUC. TRUST, EMPLOYER 
HEALTH BENEFITS: 2009 SUMMARY OF FINDINGS 1 (2009), available at http://ehbs.kff.org/pdf/2009/ 
7937.pdf (reporting that 159 million people are covered by employer-sponsored plans as of 2009). 
 59. Jacqueline R. Fox, Will Health Care Reform Increase Litigation Over Denied Claims?, 
HEALTH CARE COST MONITOR, Oct. 29, 2009, available at http://healthcarecostmonitor. 
thehastingscenter.org/jacquelinefox/will-health-care-reform-increase-litigation-over-denied-claims/. 
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expenditures were appropriate for individual patients.60  Adoption and 
exercise of this “gate-keeping” role by the insurance companies 
represented a change from the “hands off” approach to doctors’ 
decisions previously sanctioned by the courts.  This change has not been 
smooth and the transition from fee-for-service to managed care has been 
contentious, but managed care has become ubiquitous outside of 
Medicare. 
Given the structure of the Medicare Act, where coverage decisions 
are still limited to determining what is “reasonable and necessary,” CMS 
has not had the power to follow the private sector in changing its 
decision-making process to take cost into account.  Absent specific 
legislative authority to make such resource allocation decisions, the 
legality of CMS doing so is questionable.  Moreover, without any 
statutory changes that explicitly give it this power, CMS has little 
political legitimacy to make this type of decision, which is particularly 
important since decisions about access to health care have powerful 
normative implications.  As Jerry Mashaw has addressed in the context 
of other administrative actions, the perception of fairness and legitimacy 
in a life-altering, decision-making process can be extraordinarily 
important to people impacted by the decision.61 
However, even while constrained by its statutory language, it is 
impossible for CMS to ignore the cost of new medical treatments.  CMS 
must protect the fiscal security of the Medicare program.  If it fails to do 
so, it jeopardizes the provision of health care to its members and risks 
angering Congress, who, after all, must raise the money to pay the bulk 
of Medicare’s costs.  Medicare is already one of the single most 
expensive government programs in the federal budget,62 with costs 
projected to rise into the foreseeable future.63  Medicare’s funding 
comes from both payroll taxes and premiums paid by its recipients.64  
These sources of funding are heavily constrained by political pressure on 
Congress, this pressure coming from both taxpayers and the elderly.65  If 
CMS were to ignore its decision’s cost implications, Medicare’s massive 
cost could become even more problematic. 
 60. Glen P. Mays et al., Market Watch: Managed Care Rebound? Recent Changes in Health 
Plans’ Cost Containment Strategies, HEALTH AFFAIRS, Aug. 2004, available at http://content. 
healthaffairs.org/cgi/content/full/hlthaff.w4.427/DC1. 
 61. Jerry L. Mashaw, Small Things Like Reason Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the 
Administrative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 35 (2001). 
 62. PRIMER, supra note 22, at 1, 13. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 16. 
 65. See discussion infra Part IV. 
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C. National Coverage Determinations 
Structurally, Medicare faces two challenges in evaluating expensive 
new medical treatments.  The first is how to shape NCDs to encourage 
or compel Medicare recipients to make the most cost-effective decisions.  
The second is how to limit or deny coverage for new technologies or 
treatments that are too expensive for the program to support, even if they 
are effective.  As shown above, it has no power to transparently achieve 
either result, which gives it very few avenues for pursuing these goals.  
The NCD process affords CMS discretion as it determines which new 
medical treatments to cover, and it is within these discretionary acts that 
cost concerns have found a home. 
1. NCDs and the FDA: How CMS Determines Whether it Should Issue 
an NCD, and How This Relates to FDA Approval 
New medical technologies face a series of hurdles before being 
adopted for use in the United States marketplace.  The first hurdle is 
approval by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), which medical 
device and drug manufacturers must secure in order to get their products 
into the marketplace.66  A second, and equally important, hurdle is 
approval by CMS for coverage by the Medicare program.  Developers of 
medical technology know that, without approval from the CMS, their 
products will have no market among the elderly population.  
Furthermore, it is highly unlikely that private insurers will pay for 
coverage without CMS approval.67 
The decision by CMS to consider the issuance of a formal NCD is 
primarily based on the potential high cost of a new technology for 
Medicare, but it may also be considered if it appears difficult to assess 
whether the technology is appropriate for use by Medicare recipients.68  
Potential applicants can also request that CMS consider issuing an NCD 
if they believe it will clarify the coverage of a new technology.69  In the 
absence of an NCD, local Medicare administrators throughout the 
country make coverage decisions by applying the broad standards of the 
 66. See 21 C.F.R. §§ 814.1 et seq. (2010) (premarket approval of medical devices). 
 67. See PAUL N. VAN DE WATER, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, MEDICARE CHANGES 
CAN COMPLEMENT HEALTH REFORM (2008), available at http://www.cbpp.org/files/7-31-08health.pdf 
(discussing the dynamics in the healthcare industry that lead to Medicare having such a dominant role in 
coverage decisions). 
 68. See Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage Decisions, 
68 Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,634-55,641 (Sept. 26, 2003). 
 69. Id. at 55,638. 
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program.70  These local decisions need not be consistent with each other.  
Once an NCD is made, all Medicare coverage must be consistent with 
it.71  It is far more efficient for CMS to undertake NCDs in appropriate 
circumstances than for this type of decision to be made countless times 
in individual cases. 
The current CMS process for approval of new technologies or 
treatments requires three steps.  First, the care that the technology or 
treatment is to provide must fit within a general area that Medicare 
covers under the Medicare Act.72  Second, the specific treatment or 
technology must be found to be reasonable and necessary.73  Third, 
Medicare must determine how much it will pay for the proposed 
treatment.  The Medicare Act requires that this last determination be 
kept entirely separate from the first two and made only after they are 
completed.74 
Apart from the regulatory process itself, CMS encourages a 
collaborative process between persons applying for NCDs and CMS.75  
CMS has said that it wishes collaboration to begin long before a formal 
application for an NCD is filed, particularly for new technologies that 
have not been approved by the FDA for any use whatsoever.  An 
application for an NCD can be submitted to CMS at the same time as an 
application is presented to the FDA for the same device or 
pharmaceutical, if the device or pharmaceutical has already received 
FDA approval for any other use.76  However, a formal application for an 
NCD is generally not accepted by CMS until a device or pharmaceutical 
has received FDA approval for some type of use.77 
For entirely new technologies, the applicant would first apply for an 
initial approval from the FDA, wait for the approval, and then apply for 
an NCD.78  To shorten the time involved in this process, as FDA 
approval is pending, CMS will collaborate with an applicant on the 
design of the studies to be submitted so that the eventual NCD can 
proceed quickly after FDA marketing approval is given.79 
FDA approval alone, does not qualify a technology or pharmaceutical 
 70. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395x(v)(l) (West 2010). 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id.; 68 Fed. Reg. at 55,635. 
 73. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(1) (West 2010). 
 74. The Secretary of HHS determines payment amounts under § 1395(g)(a) for benefits provided 
under Part A of Medicare, and under § 13951(a) for benefits provided under Part B of Medicare. 
 75. 68 Fed. Reg. at 55,636. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
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for NCD approval.  CMS has stated that the data sufficient for FDA 
approval does not give CMS the type or degree of information it needs 
to make the decision required by the “reasonable and necessary” 
language.80  The FDA only decides if a device or pharmaceutical is 
“safe and effective,” a phrase with a precise statutory and regulatory 
meaning.81  Simply put, the FDA assesses data about a drug or device to 
ensure that it works as claimed and that the health benefits of its use 
outweigh the risks.82  FDA approval is limited in scope: the FDA only 
examines the specific use for which the sponsor applies.  Because the 
basis for FDA approval does not currently involve comparing the drug 
or device to any other available treatment, the new drug or device does 
not need to function as well or better than other ones and it does not 
need to be safer than existing protocols.83  Furthermore, because of 
numerous factors, such as the small number of study participants in FDA 
trials, the poor after-approval market analysis of adverse events, and the 
wide-spread “off-label” use of what is approved,84 FDA approval, by 
itself, gives limited information about how well a drug or device will 
actually function in the Medicare patient population.85  This approval is 
of limited use to CMS in making its own NCD. 
2. The Cost Control Potential of NCDs 
CMS’s NCDs have implications beyond the health care provided to 
Medicare recipients and have the potential to control costs for the entire 
United States healthcare system.  Once an NCD about a new medical 
technology is made, most health insurance companies follow that 
decision for their own members,86 affecting approximately 150 million 
people in private plans and another 33.3 million people who are covered 
by Medicaid.87  Consequently, the effect of these coverage decisions and 
 80. Id. 
 81. 21 U.S.C.A. § 321(p)(1), (v)(1) (West 2010) (defining “safe & effective”). 
 82. Id. 
 83. This, too, may be changing, though it is too soon to know what role the FDA will eventually 
have in assessing the comparative quality of new drugs and devices. 
 84. Off-label usage means that drugs or devices are free to be used by healthcare practitioners 
however they see fit once a single reason for use has been approved of by the FDA.  When such drugs or 
devices are used in any way besides what the FDA has approved, it is referred to as off-label. 
 85. Bruce Patsner, CMS Review Could Act as a Check on FDA Shortcomings, HEALTH L. 
PERSPECTIVES, at 1–3, Sept. 24, 2008, available at http://www.law.uh.edu/Healthlaw/perspectives/2008/ 
(BP)%20cms2.pdf. 
 86. JACOB S. HACKER, INST. FOR AM. FUTURE, THE CASE FOR PUBLIC PLAN CHOICE IN 
NATIONAL HEALTH REFORM: KEY TO COST CONTROL AND QUALITY COVERAGE 14 (2009), available at 
http://institute.ourfuture.org/files/Jacob_Hacker_Public_Plan_Choice.pdf. 
 87. HOLAHAN & COOK, supra note 13, at 2 fig.1. 
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the importance of what CMS considers when making them are 
magnified far beyond the number of Medicare recipients. 
Consider what happens if this process has to incorporate CMS’s 
unspoken concerns about cost.  From the perspective of the sophisticated 
device manufacturer, the Medicare NCD approval process is clearly 
important and any concerns CMS has should be satisfied.  The 
manufacturer must address and challenge these concerns subtly and 
indirectly because there is no step in the process where they can do it 
forthrightly.  The resulting NCD process risks distorting the scientific 
and practical conversations concerning the efficacy and general 
usefulness of the new technology that ostensibly occur in a regulatory 
environment.  As CMS increasingly focuses on the principles of 
evidence-based medicine, requiring vigorous proof of efficacy, its 
constant concern about cost creates an equally constant risk that the 
interpretation of this same evidence will be distorted in order to justify 
cost-saving choices.  For those generating the data, the risk of distortion, 
in turn, creates incentives for them to collect data in a way that is more 
resistant to any interpretations influenced by cost that they may face.  A 
more direct, open, and explicit conversation about the cost of the new 
technology would make much more sense from a practical standpoint.  
The lack of transparency in the current system undermines the 
legitimacy of the public program and creates a ripple effect, distorting 
private market decisions. 
Furthermore, once coverage has been decided in steps one and two, 
reimbursement rates are difficult for Medicare to use as a cost-saving 
device.  When CMS has agreed to cover a treatment or a technology, the 
companies that proposed the technologies or treatments have very little 
to lose in battling for generous reimbursement rates.  By legally 
separating the questions of what a new technology or treatment 
accomplishes and what it is worth to Medicare financially, the process 
makes bargaining between CMS and the manufacturers extremely 
difficult, if not impossible, by removing the coverage decision as 
leverage. 
It is in the second step of the process, determining what is “reasonable 
and necessary,” where centralized gate keeping of expensive medical 
technologies, with the concurrent cost saving, occurs for Medicare. 
3. Attempts to Define and Expand the Scope of the NCD Process 
While managed care spread throughout the private sector, CMS 
engaged in a series of unsuccessful attempts to bring concepts from 
managed care into its NCD process.  CMS published proposed 
18
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regulations in 1989, 1999, and 2000 to incorporate some features of 
managed care programs into the Medicare program.88  Given the limited 
scope of the “reasonable and necessary” language, the detailed plans 
contained in the proposed regulations likely exceeded CMS’s power to 
adopt them.  This would have adversely affected their enforceability 
under general principles of administrative law.89  In 2003, CMS took a 
different approach and published notices of the procedures it would 
follow in making NCDs that did not seek to include a role for cost. 
The stated intent of all of the proposed regulations was to define the 
criteria to be considered when deciding if a new technology or treatment 
was “reasonable and necessary,” and additionally, what would trigger an 
NCD process.90  A variety of ideas were included in the 1989, 1999, and 
2000 proposals.  In response, CMS received tens of thousands of 
negative comments91 and did not adopt any of the proposals as final 
rules.  CMS did not provide a reason for those decisions.92 
In the 1989 proposal, CMS suggested using cost effectiveness to 
analyze new technology.93  That suggestion was not adopted as a 
specific criterion for NCDs.  Cost effectiveness, popularly understood to 
mean determining if a new treatment or technology is “as effective as an 
alternative but less expensive,”94 was used in the proposed rule to 
describe a process of comparing the benefits and risks offered by a new 
technology or treatment against existing ones, while also considering the 
comparative financial costs of both.  Benefits and risks are construed 
narrowly, meaning those that occur to the patient either in the treatment 
of a short-term problem or over the course of an illness.95 
 88. See Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services Coverage 
Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4302–4318 (Jan. 30, 1989); 
Medicare Program; Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 22,619 (Apr. 27, 
1999); Medicare Program; Criteria for Making Coverage Decisions, 65 Fed. Reg. 31,124 (May 16, 
2000). 
 89. See Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006). 
 90. Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage Decisions, 68 
Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,634 (Sept. 26, 2003). 
 91. Fox, supra note 34, at 612. 
 92. 5 U.S.C. § 557(b) (2006) (clarifying that when an agency does not adopt a rule, there is no 
requirement that a reason be given.). 
 93. Medicare Program; Criteria and Procedures for Making Medical Services Coverage 
Decisions That Relate to Health Care Technology, 54 Fed. Reg. 4302, 4302–4318 (Jan. 30, 1989). 
 94. Paul E. Kalb, Controlling Health Care Costs by Controlling Technology: A Private 
Contractual Approach, 99 YALE L.J. 1109, 1112 (1990). 
 95. An example of this type of study is the recent work that comparing the use of medicated with 
non-medicated coronary artery stents for risks, benefits, cost and outcomes of each.  See Patrick W. 
Serruys et al., Percutaneous Coronary Intervention versus Coronary-Artery Bypass Grafting for Severe 
Coronary Artery Disease, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 961, 961–72 (2009); see also Kathy Hardy, 
Angioplasty vs. CABG—A Look at Comparative Effectiveness Research, RADIOLOGY TODAY, June 15, 
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The 1999 proposed rule provided for consideration of a cost-benefit 
analysis for new technologies or treatments.96  This type of analysis 
requires a society-wide assessment that is broader than the assessment in 
a cost-effectiveness analysis and can be a far more problematic 
undertaking.  A cost-benefit analysis requires numerous value 
judgments; the decision maker must determine the worth of a medical 
intervention to society, in part by comparing its benefit to those provided 
by other, unrelated expenditures.97 
A relatively simple example of a cost-benefit analysis would be an 
examination of whether people over the age of fifty should have organ 
transplant surgery.  Assuming, for purposes of this example, that organ 
transplants can be physically beneficial and life extending for individual 
patients, they are arguably cost effective in individual cases.98  A cost-
benefit analysis requires additional assessment, particularly in light of 
the limited number of organs available for transplant into all potential 
patients, many of them far younger and healthier than patients over 
fifty.99  The classic question that arises in this example is whether we 
should use a scarce organ for a young person, offering society more 
healthy, productive years, or use the organ for an older patient, who has 
already given many productive years to the society and so, from that 
perspective, might be more deserving. 
Contemplation of a refusal of coverage for an individually beneficial 
medical procedure represents an extraordinarily challenging decision for 
persons in healthcare management.  Advising sick people that they 
cannot have access to medical care because society does not value their 
lives sufficiently to pay for that care creates high emotional and 
psychological costs.  It certainly raises both moral and normative 
issues.100  This is what is at stake in a cost-benefit analysis of decisions 
of resource allocation. 
4. Using Evidence of Effectiveness in NCDs 
Since 2001, CMS has generally abandoned its effort to explicitly 
consider cost when making NCDs.  Instead, it has moved toward using 
2009, at 10 (article discussing the results of the study). 
 96. Medicare Program; Procedures for Making National Coverage Decisions, 64 Fed. Reg. 
22,619, 22,619–22,625 (Apr. 27, 1999). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Fox, supra note 34, at 580–82 (discussing the cost-benefit analysis process in the context of 
Heart Transplantation). 
 99. Id. 
 100. See generally D.J. Hunter, Rationing Health Care: The Political Perspective, 51 BR. MED. 
BULL. 876, 876–84 (1995). 
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the concepts of evidence-based medicine and comparative effectiveness 
to assess what a new technology or treatment offers Medicare recipients.  
In 2003, CMS published a notice of a proposal to revise the process for 
making NCDs.101  The purpose was to “clarify the decision-making 
process and increase the opportunity for public participation.”102  
Furthermore, the proposal embodied a new system intended to create a 
process that would be as efficient as possible, while ensuring that CMS 
had access to all relevant information for making its decisions.103  The 
notice described three types of information to be considered as a basis 
for NCDs: descriptive information, scientific evidence, and clinical 
evidence.104 
CMS determined that, in order to most efficiently generate data of the 
quality it intends to use for NCDs, it needs to work with the scientific 
and medical community early in the process of developing a technology 
for the marketplace.105  It did this with Implantable Cardiac 
Defibrillators (ICDs), as described in the case study in Part II.D.  The 
goal to secure the highest quality data also led CMS to seek to clarify the 
types of evidence it values, the best practices for study design, and the 
manner in which it ranks the quality of evidence supporting the 
technology or treatment it is evaluating.106  CMS plays an active role in 
the design of studies and collects data from its recipients regarding 
technology or procedures for which it does not yet have adequate 
evidence.107  This active role will likely be enhanced in the future 
because CMS appears to have been given a role in allocating federal 
funding for comparative effectiveness research.108  This funding source 
is useful because once a new treatment has been approved by CMS, little 
incentive remains for a manufacturer to finance further studies. 
Oddly, CMS has not explicitly stated an intention to undergo 
comparative effectiveness analysis as part of its own NCDs even though 
it supports studies that generate the necessary information for doing so.  
This intention, however, may be implied from language in the 2003 
 101. Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage Decisions, 68 
Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,634–55,641 (Sept. 26, 2003). 
 102. Id. at 55,634. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. 
 106. MEDICARE COVERAGE ADVISORY COMM. OPERATIONS & METHODOLOGY SUBCOMM., CTRS. 
FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS. PROCESS FOR EVALUATION OF EFFECTIVENESS AND COMMITTEE 
OPERATIONS (2006), available at http://www.cms.hhs.gov/FACA/Downloads/recommendations.pdf. 
 107. Id. at 6. 
 108. FED. COORDINATING COUNCIL FOR COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RES., DEP’T OF HEALTH 
& HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE CONGRESS 4 (2009) [hereinafter CER REPORT]. 
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notice regarding what type of information CMS considers in making 
NCDs.  CMS specifically asks for evidence showing the magnitude of 
the medical benefit that is, how “coverage of the item or service will 
help improve the medical benefit to the target population.”109  If a 
different treatment were already in use with Medicare recipients for the 
same diagnosis, the approval of a new treatment, arguably, would only 
improve the medical benefit for those recipients if it provided something 
better than what was already available. 
By focusing on the quality of evidence concerning new technologies 
and treatments in making NCDs, CMS enhances the possibility of 
providing health care that is most helpful to the target population but 
still has done nothing to rein in out-of-control healthcare spending.  
CMS puts itself in a position to filter out those expenses for technologies 
and treatments that are not useful but does nothing to resolve the 
problem of what to do when a technology or treatment is correctly 
identified as useful but unreasonable to provide due to cost. 
5. How the NCD Process Creates Financial Incentives for Both the 
Applicants and CMS to Distort Scientific Data 
The way CMS uses scientific data, as clarified in the 2003 notice, 
should have a significant impact on the research goals for those who 
would seek an NCD approval.  First, CMS reserved the right to withhold 
approval of a proposed treatment or technology based on inadequate 
evidence.  “In the absence of adequate evidence, we may conclude that 
the item or service is not reasonable and necessary.”110  Given that most 
medical procedures currently in use have little or no evidence to support 
their efficacy, such a determination could impose a significantly higher 
standard for approval of new technologies or treatments than the 
previous standard.  This higher standard, in turn, creates genuine 
opportunities for CMS to bring about cultural changes regarding 
adoption of new medical technologies or treatments.111  This standard 
makes it imperative for companies seeking approval to provide evidence 
of efficacy at a level high enough to be considered “adequate” by CMS. 
Given the economic importance of a positive NCD to those seeking 
CMS approval, the new language clarifies the risk calculus for them.  
While testing beyond what the FDA requires for marketing approval 
 109. Medicare Program; Revised Process for Making Medicare National Coverage Decisions, 68 
Fed. Reg. 55,634, 55,637 (Sept. 26, 2003). 
 110. Id. at 55,636. 
 111. Peter J. Neumann & Sean R. Tunis, Medicare and Medical Technology – The Growing 
Demand for Relevant Outcomes, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. 377 (2010). 
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may expose weaknesses in safety or efficacy of a technology or 
pharmaceutical, failure to perform the testing may preclude CMS 
approval altogether.  Meaningful comparisons of the efficacy of one 
treatment or technology with another are difficult without data that does 
just that, derived from studies designed to make such comparisons.  
Studies do not routinely compare “apples with apples.”  For FDA 
approval, a study is far more likely to compare an apple with no apple at 
all.  The standard tests to show benefit are measured against a baseline 
of a placebo, which is the most straightforward method for testing a new 
drug.112  Such studies are not designed to show the comparative value of 
the technology or treatment with other technologies or treatments that 
are available.  If one looks at the risks and costs faced by an applicant, 
there is no reason for a manufacturer to sponsor studies that pit its 
product against accepted or alternate ones without a specific demand 
from CMS for such comparative data.  On the other hand, proof of cost 
effectiveness or increased efficacy over current treatments would be 
highly valuable in addressing cost concerns. 
CMS’s desire to use accurate evidence for its NCDs is problematic 
because of cost.  Evidence could be presented as part of an application 
that justifies spending more money than CMS can easily absorb.  The 
higher the standards of scientific integrity CMS claims to follow, the 
more difficult it becomes to justify its interpretations of data that are not 
consistent with those standards. 
Another problem with the hidden role of cost in this regulatory 
scheme is that the FDA and CMS approval criteria create an attractive 
opportunity for applicants to maximize profitability at the cost of patient 
quality of care.  From a profit-maximizing perspective, the ideal study 
would present just enough evidence to satisfy both the FDA and 
Medicare standards, but nothing more.  The applicant would provide 
evidence to give proof of efficacy across a broad population, even if the 
measure of efficacy was somewhat low, rather than designing a study 
that would pinpoint the smaller number of those for whom the device 
would be most efficacious.  There are no absolute numeric values of 
efficacy that automatically count as satisfying the “reasonable and 
necessary” standard of the Medicare Act.  An applicant can design a 
study that is likely to find the amount of effectiveness in a given 
population that is required to show a technology is reasonable and 
necessary, while keeping the class of possible users as broadly defined 
as possible. 
This problematic dynamic may well be playing out with some 
 112. See 21 C.F.R. § 314.126 (2010) (describing the acceptable study designs for FDA 
submissions). 
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regularity in the NCD process.  On the surface, CMS values evidence of 
a high standard and vigorously promotes its collection.  The applicants 
listen to and work with CMS, and they move together to engage in an 
efficient approval process.  Below the surface, the applicants can design 
studies calculated to secure approval of the broadest, most profit-
generating scope.  CMS can then interpret this data so that it appears to 
justify artificially narrowing its approval, thus saving money.  This 
Article hypothesizes that this is exactly how the process occurs.  CMS 
has developed a way of controlling some aspects of the cost problem, 
with the most difficult decisions and negotiations being made almost 
entirely below the surface. 
6. Coverage with Limitations: The Current Compromise Between Cost 
and Evidence 
Rather than outright denying applications for NCDs, CMS has a 
pattern of approving coverage with limitations.  Doing this allows CMS 
to consider the evidence, decide that a new treatment is both reasonable 
and necessary, and limit the cost of the treatment to the program by 
giving it to fewer patients than the applicant had hoped.  A recent study 
examined sixty-nine CMS NCDs issued between 1999 and 2003 to 
assess if CMS decisions were consistent with the quality of the evidence 
then available.113  This study concluded that most CMS decisions to 
cover a technology or treatment were consistent with the quality of the 
evidence.114  The more troubling finding (though not noted as such by 
the authors) was that 61% of all CMS decisions that agreed to cover the 
technologies or treatments were limited in scope.  These NCDs provided 
coverage with substantial conditions or limiting factors.115  Even though 
the study found that the broad decision, whether or not to cover at all, 
was consistent with the evidence before CMS, it did not examine 
whether the conditions or limitations were consistent with the evidence. 
Given the extraordinary cost of new medical treatments, is it 
implausible that 61% of all NCDs over a four-year span were limited in 
scope to save money?  It is a significant possibility that this occurs, and 
evidence of this is presented in the case study discussed in Part II.D.  By 
refraining from denying coverage outright and by remaining flexible in 
the face of new data, Medicare manages to stave off political problems 
likely created by an outright denial.  To accomplish all of this, CMS 
 113. Peter J. Neumann et al., Medicare’s National Coverage Decisions, 1999–2003: Quality of 
Evidence and Review Times, 24 HEALTH AFF. 243, 243–54 (2005). 
 114. Id. at 243. 
 115. Id. at 246, 252–53. 
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must behave in a manner that is not transparent, that contravenes its 
enabling act, and that perpetuates a system distorting the healthcare 
system by generating suspect NCDs.  Given the pressure on CMS to 
manage cost in this hidden manner, the Medicare Act should be 
amended to require explicit consideration of cost in making NCDs so 
that this is no longer even a theoretical risk. 
D. A Case Study: High Quality Evidence and Implantable Cardiac 
Defibrillators 
CMS coverage of the Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators (ICD) is a 
case study that gives concrete examples of how the incentives described 
supra for both CMS and applicants distort the NCD process.  It also 
shows how the current NCD process cannot be used to adequately 
address the problem of extraordinarily expensive new medical 
treatments. 
An ICD is a small electronic device implanted in a person’s body and 
designed to restart the heart if it fails, much as an external defibrillator 
does.116  Simply put, the benefits of the implantable device over the 
external machine are that it: (1) provides constant monitoring; (2) does 
not require trained personnel to be operated; and (3) fires immediately 
when there is a problem, thereby protecting the user from damage 
caused by any delay in restarting his or her heart.  The device became 
well known when former Vice President Cheney had one implanted 
during his first term in office.117 
Initially, CMS approved coverage of ICDs for people who had 
already suffered a “sudden death” cardiac episode and had been 
successfully resuscitated.118  While purchasing and implanting the 
device was expensive, the covered population was small and the total 
cost to the Medicare program by 2001 was $1 billion a year, roughly 1% 
 116. MOSBY’S MEDICAL DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2009) (“[I]mplantable cardioverter-defibrillator 
(ICD), a surgically implanted electric device that automatically terminates lethal ventricular arrhythmias 
by delivering low-energy shocks to the heart, restoring proper rhythm when the heart begins beating 
rapidly or erratically.  About the size of an audiotape cassette, the device can be implanted without 
thoracotomy in many cases.  It is attached to the abdomen or chest wall with a wire link to the heart.”). 
 117. Abigail Trafford, Second Opinion: Implantable Defibrillators, WASH. POST, July 31, 2001, 
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/liveonline/01/health/health0731.htm. 
 118. This was an accepted treatment for these patients, particularly after 1997, when the New 
England Journal of Medicine published a study showing that ICDs worked better than the drugs 
available at that time.  See AVID Clinical Trial Ctr., A Comparison of Antiarrhythmic-Drug Therapy 
with Implantable Defibrillators in Patients Resuscitated from Near-Fatal Ventricular Arrhythmias: The 
Antiarrhythmics Versus Implantable Defibrillators (AVID) Investigators, 337 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1576, 
1576–83 (1997) (a comparison of antiarrhythmic drug therapy with implantable defibrillators in patients 
resuscitated from near-fatal ventricular arrhythmias). 
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of the Medicare annual budget at that time.119 
By November 2001, CMS was aware that studies sponsored by 
manufacturers of ICDs were showing that a far broader patient 
population could benefit from implanting the device and that it would be 
extremely expensive for Medicare to provide it to such a population.  
These new potential patients were people who suffered from heart 
problems but who had not yet suffered a sudden death cardiac episode.  
The MADIT II trial was a large-scale, multi-hospital study of ICDs 
sponsored by Guidant, an ICD manufacturer, which included this 
expanded class of potential patients.120  It was halted in November 2001 
because the data safety monitoring board that oversaw the trial found a 
large positive effect of the ICD.  This made it potentially unethical not to 
offer the device to all of the people enrolled in both arms of the trial, 
including those receiving the ICD and those receiving only medications.  
The positive results of the MADIT II trial were published in the New 
England Journal of Medicine on March 11, 2002.121  On July 18, 2002, 
the FDA expanded its approval of the Guidant ICD so that it covered the 
types of patients identified in the MADIT II study. 
By mid-2003, CMS had not expanded its coverage of ICDs to cover 
patients fitting within the MADIT II criteria.  This generated 
controversy, especially in light of the overall positive reception the trial 
results had received.122  Following on the heels of the rapid FDA 
approval action in July 2002, the American Heart Association consensus 
guidelines that guide cardiology practice recommended that cardiac 
surgeons follow the MADIT II criteria when assessing who should have 
an ICD implanted.123  In February 2003, the Medicare Coverage 
Advisory Committee that convened to assist CMS in making the ICD-
coverage decision voted unanimously in favor of coverage for the 
 119. Stephen C. Hammill, Influence of the Medicare Reimbursement System on ICD Implantation, 
5 CARDIAC ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY REV. 133, 135 (2001). 
 120. Medscape CRM, Medicare Panel Recommends Expanded Coverage for ICDs, MEDSCAPE 
TODAY, Mar. 21, 2003, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/451046 (explaining in detail the structure 
of the Second Multicenter Automated Defibrillator Implantation Trial). 
 121. Arthur J. Moss et al., Prophylactic Implantation on a Defibrillator in Patients with 
Myocardial Infarction and Reduced Ejection Fraction, 346 NEW ENG. J. MED. 877, 877, 882 (2002) (for 
the Multicenter Automatic Defibrillator Implantation Trial II Investigators). 
 122. Medscape CRM, CMS Draws Heat as Coverage of MADIT II ICD Decision Draws Near, 
MEDSCAPE TODAY, May 23, 2003, http://www.medscape.com/viewarticle/456391 [hereinafter 
Medscape Heat]. 
 123. The full title of the guidelines is the American Heart Association/American College of 
Cardiology/North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology (AHA/ACC/NASPE) Consensus 
Guidelines.  See Matthew R. Reynolds & Mark E. Josephson, MADIT II (Second Multicenter Automated 
Defibrillator Implantation Trial) Debate: Risk Stratification, Costs, and Public Policy, 108 AM. 
HEALTH ASS’N 1779, 1780 (2003). 
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MADIT II criteria.124 
On May 15, 2003, Sean Tunis, CMS’s medical director at that time, 
spoke at a public meeting on the subject of CMS’s delay in approval for 
expanded ICD coverage.125  While he listed some scientific concerns 
regarding coverage, he clearly stated that the overwhelming problem 
was “about the money,” and that CMS had to “draw a line in the sand” 
because there is “no wiggle room in the Medicare budget.”126  In a 
forthright explanation of the problems Medicare faced with new and 
expensive medical treatments, he said: 
 As money goes to higher tech services and newer benefits, we are led 
in [the] direction of under compensating for primary care, home health 
care, [and] skilled nursing care.  Medicare must avoid this tendency so 
that these worthwhile services don’t get starved as more and more 
resources are applied to newer, high tech services, especially those that 
are very expensive and have [only] modest benefits.127 
Clearly the main point of this speech was that CMS must control the 
costs of new and expensive medical treatments so that other Medicare 
programs do not suffer underfunding.  When examined in light of 
Medicare’s legal structure, it is unclear what power CMS has to 
legitimately address any of these concerns.  The ICD presented 
sufficient financial risk to Medicare to make line drawing necessary, if 
at all possible for it to accomplish.  The cost implications of the MADIT 
II trial were astonishing.128  If all existing patients with the implicated 
heart conditions had use for an ICD, it could include an estimated 3 to 5 
million patients.129  Many of these patients were Medicare recipients, 
and, in addition to the initial cost, an estimated 300,000 additional 
Medicare patients would require the ICD each year.130  At a cost of 
$30,000 a patient for the surgery and device, the initial outlay could 
 124. Id. at 1779. 
 125. Medscape Heat, supra note 122. 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id. (“At a free-wheeling CMS issues session at the North American Society of Pacing and 
Electrophysiology (NASPE) 24th Annual Scientific Sessions, Tunis bluntly told attendees that ‘it is 
about the money.’ There is no wiggle room in the Medicare budget, he said, so CMS has drawn a clear 
line in the sand.”). 
 128. Helen S. Barold, Using the MADIT II Criteria for Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators—
What is the Role of the Food and Drug Administration Approval?, 7 CARDIO ELECTROPHYSIOLOGY 
REV. 443, 446 (2004) (“The results of the MADIT II study have generated a great deal of controversy in 
the world of electrophysiology.  Much of the controversy appears related to the sheer numbers of 
potential Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillator (ICD) implants and their potential cost to the healthcare 
system.”). 
 129. Medscape Heat, supra note 122 (including those with serious coronary heart disease and 
advanced left ventricular dysfunction). 
 130. Id. (explaining the structure of this study in some detail). 
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have been as much as $150 billion, more than the entire 2002 Medicare 
budget, as well as future annual costs of $8 billion a year, 8% of 
Medicare’s annual budget.131 
Even as CMS expressed concern about cost and delayed issuing an 
NCD, it was in an awkward position regarding any criticism it could 
make about the MADIT II trial.  CMS had already made clear that it 
valued evidence of a high caliber and that it preferred to work with 
potential applicants early in the process, so that it could help ensure that 
the studies submitted to it were well designed.  Consistent with this 
commitment, CMS and the FDA advised Guidant on how to collect data 
on safety and efficacy during the MADIT II trial that would serve to 
satisfy CMS’s and the FDA’s different approval requirements.132  Given 
CMS’s early role in the study and the otherwise positive reception for its 
results, CMS’s challenges to the quality of the data were going to be 
difficult to justify. 
From CMS’s perspective, one could argue that the overwhelming 
flaw in the study was that it failed to identify who was most likely to 
truly benefit from the ICD.  The study showed solid evidence of benefit 
in a small percentage of a broad population when all of the population 
used the device, but did not give enough information to assess which 
specific people needed it.133  Put another way, the data as presented by 
Guidant showed that a small percentage of a large population would get 
a positive benefit from having these devices.134  The data did not give a 
clear picture of how to identify, in advance, which patients would 
benefit.  If CMS could accurately identify these people, it would save 
money as well as prevent unnecessary and risky medical procedures for 
its recipients.  Furthermore, the question of how coverage could be 
structured had been left open until more information had been collected 
to assist CMS in narrowing the target population.  MADIT II did not, by 
itself, answer this query because it provided insufficient data about 
subgroups within its subjects.135 
While it would be unfair to expect a single study to answer all 
questions one could have, the contemporaneous criticisms of Guidant’s 
study appear to substantiate a claim that it was meant to give little 
information to guide those making stratification decisions.  The clear 
 131. Id. 
 132. Moss et al., supra note 121. 
 133. Medscape Heat, supra note 122. 
 134. Reynolds & Josephson, supra note 123, at 1781. 
 135. Id. (“From the outset, there has been concern that compared with current risk-stratification 
strategies, less selective criteria for ICD implantation could result in many patients receiving ICDs who 
do not stand to benefit from them, exposing some patients to unnecessary risks and using societal 
resources less efficiently.”). 
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financial incentive for applicants in the NCD process is to show enough 
benefit to have coverage be “reasonable and necessary” in the broadest 
possible group of people.  Guidant succeeded in this to such an 
extraordinary degree with MADIT II as to push CMS into a financial 
corner. 
As an example of study design choices that are consistent with the 
incentives described here, MADIT II enrolled people with both 
inducible and noninducible ventricular arrhythmias, but did not test them 
or sort them into different groups because of this difference.  Prior 
studies had shown that ICDs were effective for people with inducible 
arrhythmias, but, by lumping both types of patients together, the study 
did not give clear answers as to ICD usefulness in those with 
noninducible arrhythmias.136  This data was also never collected for the 
control group of the study, that is, the people who did not receive the 
ICD.137  CMS wanted this data to help shape its NCD and so both 
Guidant and CMS tried to interpret the MADIT II data for this 
purpose.138  It is difficult to analyze data after a study has been 
completed and these post hoc studies are not as statistically relevant as 
the results of the study itself.139  The two post hoc analyses reached 
different conclusions, and neither was as valid as other forms of 
statistical data could be.140 
CMS issued its NCD for ICDs on June 6, 2003.  It expanded the 
scope of coverage from what it had covered before, but coverage was 
substantially narrower than the MADIT II criteria.  It did not follow its 
own advisory board recommendation or the FDA marketing approval.  
Instead, it conducted a post hoc analysis of the MADIT II data and 
created a stratification strategy that sharply limited the number of 
potential patients who would qualify for ICDs.  The validity of this post 
hoc analysis was strongly criticized when the NCD was issued.  A 
typical criticism of the coverage policy claimed that it was dependant on 
CMS’s “controversial interpretation [of the MADIT II data] that was 
widely viewed by the medical community as an arbitrary attempt to 
reduce the coverage population.”141  Although cost was a problem 
 136. Id. at 1779–80. 
 137. Id. at 1780. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. (“That these analyses even became necessary in our opinion simply illustrates that the 
most crucial clinical question to arise from MADIT II (is EP testing necessary?) was inadequately 
addressed by the design of the study. In retrospect, a study enrolling only noninducible patients might 
have generated less controversy.”). 
 141. Michael O. Sweeny et al., Rules of Evidence: CMS and the Primary Prevention of Sudden 
Cardiac Death in Systolic Heart Failure, 28 PACE 81, 83 (2005). 
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openly discussed by Medicare officials, “the internal technology 
assessment conducted by CMS on MADIT II specifically excluded cost 
effectiveness studies.”142  This CMS claim, that cost played no factor in 
its decision, was not credible.143 
Is it necessary, in light of this history of how the ICD-NCD process 
occurred, for CMS to change?  CMS saved money, protecting Medicare 
from financial ruin.  It has been flexible in its coverage of ICDs since 
2003, issuing new, modified NCDs as better data about ideal patient 
populations has been collected.144  Patients have access to ICDs, and the 
United States is doing well in providing access compared to other 
countries.145  As described above, the problem is with the process CMS 
used.  The purpose of this case study is to show how the cost of new 
medical treatments can influence CMS’s coverage decisions and the 
harm that results.  There was no transparent, public debate about how 
much money should be spent on ICDs, nor was there an open discussion 
about the quality of evidence that should be required before expanding 
the use of this treatment or to justify paying for it.  Instead, the existence 
of questions about the quality of the evidence was used as an 
opportunity to justify cost savings for Medicare. 
III. COMPARATIVE-EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH 
A discussion about cost and Medicare would be incomplete without 
some consideration of Comparative Effectiveness Research (CER).  
CER has been promoted as a way to control the cost of the healthcare 
system, particularly Medicare,146 but in truth it is not likely to control 
cost unless it is coupled with some form of programmatic rationing.  On 
its own, CER can be directly used to guide patient decision-making, 
without regard for cost.  Coupled with policy decisions regarding 
 142. Reynolds & Josephson, supra note 123, at 1783 (referencing Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid 
Services, Decision Memorandum: Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators, # 00157N (2003)). 
 143. Id. at 1781 (“The result is awkward, with CMS publicly pretending that their decisions are 
not driven in part by financial motives, and nobody really believing them.”). 
 144. Sweeny et al., supra note 141, at 81 (discussing CMS’s continuing efforts to correctly 
identify appropriate ICD recipients). 
 145. Christopher S. Simpson, Implantable Cardioverter Defibrillators Work—So Why Aren’t We 
Using Them?, 177 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 49, 49 (2007) (discussing utilization). 
 146. See, e.g., Robert, Steinbrook, Health Care and the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, 
360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1057, 1057 (2009) (“[C]omparative effectiveness studies that directly compare 
the risks and benefits of different treatments for a particular condition are essential for improving 
practice and slowing cost escalation.”); THE HENRY J. KAISER FAMILY FOUND., EXPLAINING HEALTH 
REFORM: WHAT IS COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS RESEARCH? 1 (2009), available at 
http://www.kff.org/healthreform/upload/7946.pdf (“Identifying the most effective and efficient 
interventions has the potential to reduce unnecessary treatments, which in turn, may help lower costs.”). 
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rationing, CER can be used to guide resource allocations, thus allowing 
finite resources to be spent in a manner that secures the best outcomes 
for patients in the aggregate.  Given the current problems with hidden 
rationing in Medicare, CER results are at risk of being distorted relied 
upon as scientific support for what are, in truth, political and societal 
decisions about healthcare rationing.147 
Additionally, the usefulness of CER is significantly compromised due 
to persistent public distrust of its ultimate goals.148  Currently, the public 
does not trust healthcare research about effectiveness generated by both 
private enterprise and the government.149  There is no clear reason for 
this public distrust except, perhaps, due to the fear that the research will 
be used to justify rationing without any public debate.150  CER is not the 
same as the rationing decisions that may be made in its name, but this 
fact is poorly understood.  If future CER findings are manipulated by 
CMS, this will only serve to confirm people’s fears and undermine the 
ability of CER to improve the quality of the healthcare system. 
Important for this discussion is the increase in federal funding for 
CER, and the structure for conducting it.  The Federal Coordinating 
 147. For an excellent discussion of this vulnerability in the context of politics, the healthcare 
industry and CER, see Susan Bartlett Foote, How Comparative Effectiveness Can Save Money, HEALTH 
CARE COST MONITOR, July 7, 2009, available at http://healthcarecostmonitor. 
thehastingscenter.org/suasanbartlettfoote/how-comparative-effectiveness-research-can-save-money/ 
(“Comparative effectiveness will not save money unless supporters of value-based care stand up and 
say—let’s not just gather evidence, let’s be sure we do not pay for care that is inconsistent with it.”). 
 148. Consider, for example, the November 2009 recommendations about the frequency of 
mammograms by the United States Preventive Services Task Force and the public response.  These 
recommendations called for mammograms to start at a later age and take place less frequently than had 
been called for by its previous recommendation from 2002.  The new recommendations unleashed a 
public controversy, with the Secretary of Health and Human Services finally assuring voters that the 
federal government policies about mammograms would not change as a result of these 
recommendations.  See Editorial, Sebelius: Mammogram Policies Unchanged, UPI.COM, Nov. 18, 
2009, http://www.upi.com/Top_News/US/2009/11/18/Sebelius-Mammogram-policies-unchanged/UPI-
18271258591793/ (notably failing to address whether the panel recommendations were actually correct 
or appropriate); see also Roni Caryn Rabin, Doctor-Patient Divide on Mammograms, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 
10, 2010, at D7.  According to an editorial in the Annals of Internal Medicine from February 2010, 
doctors are more inclined to accept the new recommendations, implying, arguably, that there is at least 
some scientific merit to the new recommendations.  Editorial, When Evidence Collides with Anecdote, 
Politics, and Emotion: Breast Cancer Screening, 152 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 531 (2010). 
 149. NAT’L PUBLIC RADIO ET AL., THE PUBLIC AND THE HEALTH CARE DELIVERY SYSTEM 2 
(2009), http://www.npr.org/documents/2009/apr/nprpoll_charts.pdf (reporting poll results showing 72% 
of Americans think there is insufficient scientific research to show what will work best for patients, and 
only 55% would trust an independent panel of experts to help make these determinations, with the 
percentage trusting this panel dropping to 41% if the federal government plays a role in appointing these 
experts and, even in the face of evidence that a treatment is not as effective as another, 56% think 
private insurers should be compelled to pay for the less effective treatment). 
 150. Rush Limbaugh, Transcript, The March to Socialized Medicine Starts in Obama’s Porkulus 
Bill, Feb. 9, 2009, http://www.rushlimbaugh.com/home/daily/site_020909/content/01125111.guest.html 
(consistently expressing the idea that the purpose of CER is to ration health care). 
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Council for CER (the Council) was created by federal law in 2009.  The 
Council was terminated under the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act of 2010,151 replaced by the Patient Centered Outcomes 
Research Trust Fund152 for the support of the Patient Centered 
Outcomes Research Institute (the Institute).  The goals of this Institute 
appear to be the same as the earlier Council, though the new legislation 
is far less detailed than the original.  The Council appears to have been 
“the source for the ‘death panel’ uproar,”153 which perhaps led to its 
demise and reconfiguration.  The original law creating the Council was 
explicit with regard to excluding cost from the recommendations the 
Council could issue based on CER studies as well as severely limiting 
the force these recommendations could carry.  While prohibiting 
discussion of cost, which one might assume will carry over to the newly 
formed Institute, may serve to protect CER from political turmoil, it also 
severely limits CER’s ability to reduce the cost of the healthcare system.  
Part III.B describes the problems of, and limitations with, CER.  Finally, 
Part III.C describes the sources for the high level of public distrust of 
CER that has become evident since this new language
A. Federal Law and CER Funding 
In February 2009, $1.1 billion in funding for CER was included in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (ARRA).154  ARRA 
also included legislation creating the Federal Coordinating Council for 
CER (the Coordinating Council), which was meant to oversee the 
distribution of much of the funding.155  The proposal to fund CER met 
some resistance, which continued throughout the debate over the 
healthcare reform, resulting in the Council being terminated in the new 
Act and replaced by the Institute.  The publically stated concern 
expressed by some commentators is that CER is a code word for 
rationing health care, and that the federal government will use CER to 
dictate the medical care to which people have access.156  The language 
 151. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 6302, 124 Stat. 119 
(2010). 
 152. § 6301(e)(1), (e)(2), (f). 
 153. See 1 CCH, CCH’S LAW, EXPLANATION AND ANALYSIS OF THE PATIENT PROTECTION AND 
AFFORDABLE CARE ACT 850 (2010). 
 154. American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.  See 
also CER REPORT, supra note 108, at 11. 
 155. 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-8 (West 2010). 
 156. See Colin Hanna, Rationing Wolves in Public Servants’ Clothing, ROLL CALL, July 6, 2009, 
available at http://www.rollcall.com/news/36488-1.html; see also Peter Singer, Why We Must Ration 
Health Care, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at MM38, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/ 
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of ARRA, as well as subsequent communications from the Coordinating 
Council, does not substantiate these claims and, in fact, goes to great 
pains to defuse this type of concern.157  The Coordinating Council 
released a report on June 30, 2009, explaining that “[t]he purpose of 
[CER] is to provide information that helps clinicians and patients choose 
which option best fits an individual patient’s needs and preferences.”158  
This information is necessary, the Coordinating Council said, due to 
“astonishing achievements in biomedical science,” leading doctors and 
patients to a “plethora of choices” when it is often “unclear which 
therapeutic choices work best for whom, when and in what 
circumstances.”159 
While the results of CER can be used to justify cost-based decisions, 
there is nothing in CER itself that directly leads to rationing.  Certainly 
benefits and problems have the potential to arise through the 
interpretation and use of CER.  Perhaps CER and its uses have been 
conflated in the public’s eye, or, of more interest here, perhaps prior use 
of CER by private and public sector healthcare payers to justify 
decisions that are motivated by unspoken cost concerns has poisoned the 
public trust. 
Whatever its source, public worry about CER has been expressed in 
graphic terms.  One of the more colorful was the accusation that funding 
for CER was part of a government goal to create “death panels,” where 
elderly patients would have to appear individually and where a 
government committee would then vote on their right to continued 
treatment.160  There have also been accusations that the Coordinating 
Council would use newly compelled electronic medical records to track 
the individual care decisions made by doctors in the country, with power 
to override any single treatment decision and many other similar 
claims.161  No language in ARRA supports any of these claims.  In fact, 
magazine/19healthcare-t.html?_r=2. 
 157. CER REPORT, supra note 108, at 16 (CER has been defined by the Coordinating Council as 
“the conduct and synthesis of research comparing the benefits and harms of different interventions and 
strategies to prevent, diagnose, treat and monitor health conditions in ‘real world’ settings.  The purpose 
of this research is to improve health outcomes by developing and disseminating evidence-based 
information to patients, clinicians, and other decision-makers, responding to their expressed needs, about 
which interventions are most effective for which patients under specific circumstances.”). 
 158. Id. at 3 (containing part of a longer definition of the purpose of the Council’s work). 
 159. Id. 
 160. Limbaugh, supra note 150 (quoting Betsy McCaughey, former Lt. Governor of N.Y.). 
 161. Id.  See also Kurt Nimmo, Barney Frank, Eugenics Death Panels, and a Dining Room Table, 
FREE REPUBLIC, Aug. 19, 2009, http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/2320327/posts (The Council’s 
“purpose is to empower an unelected bureaucracy to make decisions about healthcare rationing that 
elected politicians are politically unable to make.”); Rich Lowery & Robert Costa, The Rogue, on the 
Record, NAT’L REV. ONLINE, Nov. 17, 2009, http://article.nationalreview.com/414954/the-rogue-on-the-
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the Coordinating Council went to excessive lengths to make clear that its 
purpose is to enhance the quality of information that a doctor and patient 
consider when making individual, patient care decisions.162  Yet, as of 
September 2009, 41% of Americans believed that healthcare reform 
included a panel that would prevent the elderly from obtaining necessary 
medical care, as described by critics of CER and the Coordinating 
Council.163 
CER is especially important because the healthcare system does not 
currently include any centralized resource allocation system.  While 
there are benefits to allowing autonomous decisions regarding individual 
healthcare choices, the responsibility for demanding value, minimizing 
waste, and being responsible about resource uses now rests heavily upon 
individual patients, the medical establishment, and insurance companies.  
The information presented by high quality CER is a resource that can 
guide these individual decisions if the conclusions are trusted.  As 
described below, this trust is not currently assured, and failure to change 
the system to allow it to flourish may cripple many of the goals of 
healthcare reform.  Medicare, as currently constructed, is a part of this 
problem, but it can readily become part of its resolution. 
B. Problems with CER 
CER can be useful, but it is extremely complex and potentially 
problematic to implement recommendations based on its results.  CER’s 
usefulness depends on a fairly sophisticated level of understanding 
regarding the meaning of its results and how to use that information.  It 
may be that this complexity is what raises such significant public 
concerns.  If so, it is essential to have trusted resources for both 
record/rich-lowry-and-robert-costa?page=3 (Sarah Palin describing why she referred to the Council as a 
“death panel”: “While reading that section of the bill, it became so evident that there would be a panel of 
bureaucrats who would decide on levels of health care, decide on those who are worthy or not worthy of 
receiving some government-controlled coverage,” which would, in turn “lead to harm.”). 
 162. CER REPORT, supra note 108, at 59.  In its response to the negative public outcries, an 
interesting notation appears in the minutes of the Coordinating Council’s second meeting: “Council 
members also noted that they had heard, loud and clear, that the Council’s governance and processes 
must be transparent, and that the Council must incorporate input from all stakeholders to gain credibility 
and build trust.”  Id.  This comment makes it clear that trust and credibility are problems here. 
 163. Opinion Res. Corp., CNN Opinion Research Poll, at 7, Sept. 13, 2009, available at 
http://i2.cdn.turner.com/cnn/2009/images/09/14/rel14b2.pdf.  Typical of the incoherency within this 
debate, the argument has been that the Council, as created in February 2009, would lead to death panels 
whereas the Poll, given in September 2009, was asking about people’s concerns with proposals for 
future healthcare reform, specifically: “If Obama’s plan became law, do you think senior citizens or 
seriously-ill patients would die because government panels would prevent them from getting the medical 
treatment they needed?”  Id.  One could argue, then, that it is unclear what, exactly, these fears are even 
peripherally related to. 
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communicating and educating.  For a sick person, the availability of 
reliable and unbiased information comparing the available treatments is 
useful, and, so, from that perspective, it seems strange that the collection 
of such information would become a lightning rod for political debate.  
As one conservative commentator put it, “CER is obviously a valuable 
and time-honored endeavor, and for anyone (conservatives or anyone 
else) to come out against it would be akin to coming out against babies, 
or bunnies.”164 
An example of CER’s usefulness is a study from 2009 that offered 
guidance to patients making decisions about heart surgery.  This study 
compared two treatments available for people with serious heart disease: 
an invasive type of heart surgery as compared to a less invasive 
implantation of cardiac stents.165  Comparing the two procedures across 
a large population of patients, it appeared that if a patient had a stent 
implanted, she would have a greater risk of needing further surgery.166  
If, on the other hand, the patient had the more invasive heart surgery, she 
would have a greater risk of suffering serious strokes.167  Closer analysis 
of the data implied that if a patient had a more serious form of heart 
disease, she might not benefit from the stents as much as she would from 
the surgical procedure.168  Such information did not present an easy or 
obvious choice for patients and necessarily required close 
communication with the treating physician to ascertain the best 
approach.169  The CER, however, did add significant information to the 
decision-making process. 
There are limitations to what a healthcare study can be expected to 
accomplish.  Statistics about the efficacy of medical care provide 
percentages of success, failure, and the risk of side effects in the study 
population.  Because efficacy is rarely proven in 100% of cases, patients 
who go forward with medical treatment do so with foreknowledge of 
some risk.  The statistics show that the healthcare system consistently 
both under- and over-treat.  A certain number of patients will be given a 
 164. Posting of DrRich to Better Health, http://www.getbetterhealth.com/who’s-against-
comparative-effectiveness-research/2009.05.15 (May 15, 2009). 
 165. See Patrick W. Serruys et al., Percutaneous Coronary Intervention versus Coronary-Artery 
Bypass Grafting for Severe Coronary Artery Disease, 360 NEW ENG. J. MED. 961, 961–72 (2009). 
 166. Id. (specifically, an increased risk of needing “revascularization”). 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Roni Caryn Rabin, Heart Stents Found as Effective as Bypass for Many Patients, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/20/health/ 
20heart.html?_r=1&ref=health (“‘What they’re telling us is that these procedures are similar in many 
respects,’ he added.  ‘For individual patients, one is often better than the other.  For a patient who can 
have either one, there are pluses or minuses to each one.’” (quoting Dr. L. David Hillis, Chairman of the 
Dep’t of Med. at the Univ. of Tex. Med. Sch. in San Antonio)). 
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treatment and not benefit and a certain number of patients will suffer 
side effects.  Some unfortunate patients will not have positive effects 
and will suffer side effects.  When research predicts a percentage of 
“winners” from an intervention, it is known that the balance of that 
100% will be “losers” of some sort. 
For an example of winners and losers, consider a hypothetical—a 
simple study of effectiveness for a new antibiotic.  If the new antibiotic 
A is 80% effective in a sample population for curing a specific bacterial 
infection Z, then if the same ratio holds true for the general population 
outside of the study, 20% of the people given the antibiotic will not 
benefit from it.  Since all medical treatment has some risk of a negative 
side effect or allergy, that 20% will be exposed to this risk of harm 
without receiving any benefits. 
A comparison of the effectiveness of two antibiotics, as is performed 
in CER, becomes more complex.  If research shows that Antibiotic B is 
effective in 20% of a similar sample population for a similar problem as 
in the original study about A, new problems emerge.  A simple response 
to this comparison would be to use A and not use B, since B’s efficacy is 
much lower than A’s.  But what if some of the 20% for whom B works 
are the same people who do not receive a benefit from A?  Presuming 
CER has not generated a method for absolutely identifying which group 
a patient belongs in, the risk of using the wrong antibiotic remains. 
From a societal perspective, CER presents a different problem.  
Because of the research, it is known that a predictable amount of waste 
and some unnecessary exposure to the risks of negative effects will 
occur when using either antibiotic.  Across a population, an antibiotic 
that has an 80% success rate is clearly better than one with a 20% 
success rate.  Putting that conclusion into a specific policy and choosing 
A over B, deprives 20% of the population of a treatment that might work 
for them.  A policy could also be implemented that would provide both 
A and B, letting patients decide, but that risks curing far fewer people if 
many choose what is known, statistically, to be the wrong choice for the 
population as a whole.  Using a broad protocol for all patients based on 
CER, entrenches the numbers of losers and winners.  Failure to continue 
research in an area after adopting a protocol risks stifling research into 
new protocols that could improve outcomes.  Such a result would not be 
risked in the absence of a CER-supported protocol.  The challenge with 
the information available from CER is to resist over-simplifying, that is, 
reaching for an easy decision about medical treatments when the data 
alone does not justify that response. 
The political implications become greater when one adds a cost 
component to this discussion.  Add to the complexity of the decision 
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about antibiotics A and B the fact that B costs ten, or even one hundred 
times, more than A.  Again, the instinct is to choose A, but the same 
problems remain.  The cost difference could make a difference in how 
society views B, since it has both a low efficacy across the population 
and a high overall cost, but it does not change what happens to the 20% 
for whom B would work.  This is the point where hidden-cost concerns 
can be most damaging to the usefulness of CER.  The temptation to 
maximize the dollar value of interventions, while at the same time 
avoiding the appearance of making difficult allocation decisions, could 
prevent the system from further probing the potential usefulness of B.  
This can be accomplished by saying that B is simply not good enough 
because it only works in 20% of the patients.  While reliable information 
can be generated by CER, it can then be used to make rigid decisions 
based on both CER and cost, without a public airing of how cost 
considerations are taken into account.  This appears to be the fear behind 
the criticisms of CER and is a problem likely to arise in Medicare. 
C. Why the Public Mistrusts Data 
The difficulties with CER as described above, while challenging, are 
likely only one reason for the public debate.  Those who control data can 
easily manipulate it, as the public has seen in various contexts in recent 
years.  It would be sensible for this to lead to suspicions about study 
results.  The subtle distortion of data that occurs in the CMS approval 
process is not likely to be widely understood, and it is hardly fair to 
place the blame on CMS for the strong opposition to CER. 
A significant reason for the public’s mistrust lies with the 
pharmaceutical industry.  Research into the efficacy of drugs and 
medical devices is widely considered unreliable and riddled with 
scandal, and, as a result, people do not trust pharmaceutical companies 
or those who regulate them.170  Proof of “safety and efficacy,” as 
certified by the FDA, is a promise to patients, but it is also a necessary 
 170. See News Release, Harris Interactive, Large Numbers of People Do Not Trust the Institutions 
They Identify as Most Responsible for Drug Safety (Apr. 25, 2007), http://www.harrisinteractive.com/ 
news/allnewsbydate.asp?NewsID=1216.  The poll data on this issue shows, repeatedly, that this distrust 
is quite strong.  A Harris Interactive poll of United States adults, for example, found that 
only 45 percent of people somewhat trust or very strongly trust the U.S. FDA.  Only 27 
percent of people somewhat or very strongly trust pharmaceutical companies.  Only 20 
percent of people somewhat or very strongly trust Congress.  However, many more 
people, a 58 percent majority, somewhat or very strongly trust doctors or other 
professionals who prescribe drugs. 
Id.  The same poll found that most people do not believe that drug companies will ever release any data 
about adverse reactions to their drugs. 
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tool to open the door to the marketplace for drug and device companies.  
This marketplace focus appears to have influenced both the collection of 
data and how it is presented to the public.171  Efficacy, as a concept, is 
currently tainted in the public’s eye by its association with the 
pharmaceutical industry and the FDA approval process.172 
The public has seen a number of examples in the press of unreliable 
behavior by drug companies and researchers relating to the development 
and use of effectiveness data.  One extensively reported story concerned 
a physician-scientist named Dr. Timothy Kuklo, a military surgeon at 
Walter Reed Hospital.  According to press reports, during his time at the 
hospital, Dr. Kuklo was alleged to have received payments of more than 
$850,000 from Medtronic, which manufactures Infuse, a bioengineered 
bone-growth protein.173  In addition, he appears to have falsified study 
results to show that Infuse worked well, published the falsified results in 
a prestigious journal,174 listed another researcher as a co-author who had 
never heard of the project, and failed to disclose his financial conflict of 
interest to the journal prior to publication.175  The manufacturers of 
Celebrex used positive data to support a positive article that was 
published in the Journal of the American Medical Association (JAMA), 
although they did not include the data from the same study that had less 
positive results.176  The manufacturer then submitted the full set of data 
to the FDA, who found significant problems.177  The ensuing problems 
led to a class action securities fraud lawsuit against the manufacturer, as 
its behavior had caused the price of its securities to decline.178 
The list of publicly reported types of drug company behavior that 
reduce public trust is quite extensive.  There has been public exposure of 
“ghost-writing,” a practice in which highly regarded scientists sign their 
 171. MARCIA ANGELL, THE TRUTH ABOUT THE DRUG COMPANIES: HOW THEY DECEIVE US AND 
WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT (2005), available at http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2004/jul/15/the-
truth-about-the-drug-companies/. 
 172. Harlan M. Krumholz & Joseph S. Ross, Relationships with the Drug Industry: More 
Regulation, Greater Transparency, 338 BMJ b211 (2009), available at http://www.bmj.com/cgi/ 
content/full/338/feb03_2/b211 (analyzing Harris Interactive poll, supra note 170, and other studies 
showing both the distrust and vulnerability of consumers and patients). 
 173. Barry Meier & Duff Wilson, Medical School Says Former Army Surgeon Hid Ties to 
Medtronic, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2009, at B3, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/15/ 
business/15device.html. 
 174. Id.  See also Timothy Kuklo, Recombinant Human Bone Morphogenetic Protein-2 for Grade 
III Open Segmental Tibial Fractures from Combat Injuries in Iraq, 90-B J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 1068 
(2008) (withdrawn by: J. Scott, Withdrawal of a Paper, 91-B J. BONE & JOINT SURG. 285, 286 (2009)). 
 175. Meier & Wilson, supra note 173. 
 176. Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Pharmacia Corp., 554 F.3d 342, 344 (3d Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 130 S. Ct. 2401 (2010). 
 177. Id. at 345. 
 178. Id. (discussing at length the data manipulation surrounding Celebrex). 
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names to articles in medical journals without participating in the studies 
or writing the articles later attributed to them.179  Additionally, 
researchers have not been consistently forthcoming about financial 
conflicts of interest regarding the subject they are writing about, even 
when journals require such disclosure as a condition for publication.180 
With CER, people are frightened by the possibility of the 
manipulation of effectiveness data to justify rationing health care, but it 
is the many known and widely publicized instances of data manipulation 
that have led to this environment of distrust and presumptive 
illegitimacy.  Creating a system for collecting CER that ostensibly 
protects it from the explicit consideration of cost, as the Coordinating 
Council legislation does, will not make people trust CER.  It will add to 
the climate of distrust, because people assume cost is an unspoken and 
powerful part of CER conclusions and recommendations.  The current 
CER system has the potential to create additional layers of opaque, cost-
based decision-making that can be added to the current NCD process. 
IV. POLITICAL SELF-INTEREST AND MEDICARE 
There is a widespread belief that it is politically damaging for 
government to explicitly limit access to health care in order to save 
money.181  This belief may contribute to Congress’ tolerance of the 
current NCD process, where CMS improperly takes cost into account 
when determining the scope of coverage and does so without 
transparency. 
Congressional tolerance for the current NCD system, though harmful, 
persists.  Given the importance of health care to society182 and given that 
 179. Joseph S. Ross et al., Guest Authorship and Ghostwriting in Publications Related to 
Rofecoxib: A Case Study of Industry Documents From Rofecoxib Litigation, 299 JAMA 1800 (2008), 
available at http://jama.ama-assn.org/cgi/content/abstract/299/15/1800 (examining documents that were 
produced during discovery for a products liability case concerning rofecoxiband that showed the 
prevalence of ghost writing along with a pattern of keeping this hidden). 
 180. See MERRILL GOOZNER, CTR. FOR SCI. IN THE PUB. INTEREST, UNREVEALED: NON-
DISCLOSURE OF CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN FOUR LEADING MEDICAL AND SCIENTIFIC JOURNALS 2 
(2004), available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/unrevealed_final.pdf. 
 181. In support of this belief, a national poll from October 2009 found that nearly 80% of people 
polled said they oppose restrictions on access to health care if treatments will not be covered because 
they are too costly, not essential or have too little chance of success.  See Gary Langer, Growing Health 
Care Concerns Fuel Cautious Support for Change, ABCNEWS, Oct. 29, 2003, http://abcnews.go.com/ 
images/pdf/935a3HealthCare.pdf. 
 182. In support of this assertion, a recent poll found that 93% of Americans polled said it was 
extremely or very important that their healthcare plan cover tests and treatments that they or their doctor 
thought were necessary.  Jeffrey M. Jones, Majority in U.S. Favors Healthcare Reform This Year, 
GALLUP, July 14, 2009, http://www.gallup.com/poll/121664/majority-favors-healthcare-reform-this-
year.aspx. 
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healthcare spending is widely considered to be out of control,183 it is 
striking that a more aggressive system for defining public values and 
allocating spending accordingly in Medicare has not been implemented.  
Congress should demand that Medicare justify the cost of new medical 
treatments that it wishes to provide its recipients.  The health of the 
Medicare population should be of paramount concern, and in the face of 
finite resources, any change in how Medicare funding is allocated 
should require an explanation as to how the change improves the 
program.  Political self-interest theory presumes that a government 
official will make choices that maximize the goods he seeks and 
minimize his harms.184  Under this theory, Congress must be acting 
under the belief that advocating for reduced healthcare expenditures 
would harm this self-interest, and so the underlying truth of the matter 
needs to be examined.  There is substantial criticism of the political self-
interest theory that calls into question how accurate the theory is at 
predicting or describing Congressional decision-making.185  But, 
assuming for the sake of argument that the theory is correct, the Oregon 
healthcare system presents a counter-argument as to the effect of 
rationing on political support.  Oregon has transparent healthcare 
rationing that is subject to public debate, and supporters of that system 
do not appear to suffer political penalties. 
A. Political Self-Interest: Is Rationing Risky? 
In The Politics of Health Legislation: An Economic Perspective,186 
Paul Feldstein discusses in detail a theory of how political self-interest 
functions in healthcare legislation.  Feldstein posits that legislators are 
essentially interested in their own self-interest and that if one can 
ascertain the relevant types of legislative actions that are good or bad for 
that self-interest, one can predict how Congress will behave.  Central to 
this premise is that legislators are only concerned with a narrow cost-
benefit analysis that pertains to their re-election, rather than a concern 
over the costs and benefits of legislation to society.187  This self-interest 
functions within a political marketplace where political support 
(campaign contributions, votes and volunteers) is traded for the benefits 
 183. Id.  In this same poll, 52% of Americans polled said that controlling cost was the most 
important goal of healthcare reform.  Id. 
 184. See discussion infra notes 186–187 and accompanying text. 
 185. See infra notes 200–205 and accompanying text. 
 186. PAUL J. FELDSTEIN, THE POLITICS OF HEALTH LEGISLATION: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 
(3d ed. 2006). 
 187. Id. at 10. 
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of legislation.188 
There are two main groups of people who seek to benefit from 
legislation in this marketplace.  Population groups seek wealth 
transfers.189  Private sector corporations and industries seek legislation 
that increases and protects their profitability, and protects them from 
intrusive regulation.190  A group needs to be motivated to act, and, if the 
group is rational, this will occur when the effect of potential legislation 
is great enough to justify the costs of organizing and participating in the 
political process.191  When a situation gives a group a rational 
motivation to act, the group has developed a “concentrated interest” in 
the political process.192  Concentrated interests can be created by both 
benefits and burdens of legislation and, because of this, a politician must 
create benefits for the intended group without putting substantial 
burdens on a different group who would then organize in opposition.193  
Thus, the ideal legislative action creates a highly visible benefit for at 
least one group and a diffuse set of burdens that do not motivate any 
other group to oppose it.194 
Using this theory, Medicare, as currently constructed, can be 
described as an ideal legislative action because it generates substantial 
political benefit with minimal risk.  First, it provides a large, highly 
visible benefit to its participants, many of whom would be foreclosed 
from participation in the private market due to age or pre-existing 
conditions,195 and so would otherwise not have health insurance.  
Second, it provides a benefit to the healthcare industry, whose revenues 
have increased due to Medicare.196  The funding of the program is 
relatively diffuse.  Money is primarily provided by people who work and 
pay taxes,197 and there are roughly 160 million employed people in the 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. at 11.  For example, the elderly seek the financial benefit from Medicare.  Id. 
 190. Id. 
 191. Id.  Cost is a broad term that includes financial contributions, volunteer efforts, protests, etc.  
The term is used to encompass all of the things one can do to influence the process that requires 
expending one’s resources: time, money, influence, energy, etc. 
 192. Id. 
 193. Id.  Funding allocations to one program that require taking money from another program can 
also risk creating a concentrated interest in the group that is losing the benefit of financing.  This 
happens “[w]hen the financial commitments imposed on it [or demanded from it] require cutbacks in 
other politically popular programs or necessitate a tax increase.”  Id. at 154. 
 194. Id. at 11.  The preference for creating diffuse burdens would explain why legislators would 
rather borrow to fund a program than tax current constituents.  The cost is shifted to the distant future. 
 195. Before Medicare was enacted, people over sixty-five were mostly shut out of the private 
market for health insurance.  Fox, supra note 34, at 585. 
 196. FELDSTEIN, supra note 186, at 3. 
 197. Id. 
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United States sharing this burden.198  The program shifts resources from 
these workers to the two groups that benefit.  The workers funding 
Medicare receive a promise that they will benefit in the future as a 
Medicare beneficiary.  The risk of any substantial increase in the cost of 
this future care is shifted to future generations, who will pay for it with 
their payroll taxes.199 
Medicare’s structure creates an incentive for Congress to maintain or 
increase the cost of the program, up to a certain point.  The large base of 
taxpayers who support Medicare can absorb a small rise in the payroll 
tax without experiencing enough discomfort to justify opposing the 
program.  If this same amount was cut directly from Medicare, both its 
participants and the companies that benefit from providing healthcare 
services would be more likely to have a concentrated interest in the 
legislation, justifying political action.  Overt cost control over Medicare 
will only become politically necessary when the payroll tax is raised 
high enough to create an incentive for organized political opposition to 
Medicare.  If CMS’s current efforts to control costs are sufficient to 
keep Medicare funding below this level, the efforts successfully protect 
congressional self-interest.  Congress would lack motivation to intrude 
on CMS’s NCD process, even if not properly conducted under the 
Medicare Act. 
The narrow view of Congressional self-interest described here has 
been challenged,200 both in terms of the accuracy of its descriptive or 
predictive claims and in the underlying soundness of its central theme.  
This theory of self-interest is essentially meant to be descriptive, yet 
fails to take into account numerous political actions that do not fit its 
model.201  For example, there are a number of regulatory regimes for 
public health and safety that exist, yet, under this theory, they should not 
because they provide diffuse benefits and concentrated costs.202  
Furthermore, this self-interest theory fails to account for the consistent 
impact of personal ideology on legislators’ voting behavior.203  Second, 
there is substantial support for a contrary view of the political system, 
 198. SOC. SEC. ADMIN., SOCIAL SECURITY: UNDERSTANDING THE BENEFITS 4 (2010), available at 
http://ssa.gov/pubs/10024.html. 
 199. FELDSTEIN, supra note 186, at 154. 
 200. Jerry L. Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice: Critique and Rapprochement, in 
RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 19 (Daniel A. Farber eds. et al., 2010) 
(fully discussing political self-interest and its flaws).  Repeating here the arguments against the narrow 
view of Congressional self-interest would be outside the scope of this Article, yet the topic, in all detail, 
is of great importance to the debate about how to ration health care in the United States system. 
 201. Id. at 25. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. (as empirical studies have shown). 
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one where the shared, communal goal of the political process is to create 
a collective definition of public values and where Congress is a willing 
participant.204  In this view, the work that voters undertake to participate 
in the system, such as political organization and education, are actually 
perceived as benefits that people seek, rather than burdens or costs that 
are only reluctantly undertaken.205  Increasing public participation in 
healthcare resource-allocation decisions would increase the opportunity 
for voters to have this benefit. 
B. Oregon: An Example of Political Viability206 
In 1987, Neil Goldschmidt, the governor of Oregon, appointed a 
working group to determine what Oregon’s Medicaid program should 
cover.207  This group made a series of findings,208 the first being that all 
Oregon citizens should have access to a basic level of care.  Second, it 
found that there must be a process to define what the basic level of care 
is, and, further, that this “process must be based on criteria that are 
publicly debated, reflect a consensus of social values, and consider the 
good of society as a whole.”209 
The Oregon Health Services Commission (the Commission) was 
created in 1989210 to create a list of medical benefits to be included in 
the “basic” level of care.  The Commission crafts this list through a 
biennial process that “represent[s] an unusual marriage of health 
services research and deliberative democracy,”211 including holding an 
extensive series of public meetings, as well as analyzing scientific 
 204. Id. (citing Arthur Maas, CONGRESS AND THE COMMON GOOD (1983); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38 STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, Legal 
Interference with Private Preferences, U. CHI. L. REV. 1129 (1986)). 
 205. Id. 
 206. Oregon’s approach to health care and cost is described in this Article only for the purpose of 
providing an example of sustained electorate support of a government healthcare system that directly 
addresses cost.  Much more can, and has, been said about Oregon.  For an in-depth discussion, see 
Leonard M. Fleck, Just Caring: Oregon, Health Care Rationing, and Informed Democratic 
Deliberation, 19 J. MED. & PHIL. 367 (1994); Somnath Saha et al., Giving Teeth to Comparative-
Effectiveness Research—The Oregon Experience, 362 NEW ENG. J. MED. e18 (2010).  See also 
RATIONING AMERICA’S MEDICAL CARE: THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND (Martin A. Strosberg et al. 
eds., 1992).  For a particularly critical analysis, see Jonathan Oberlander et al., Rationing Medical Care: 
Rhetoric and Reality in the Oregon Health Plan, 164 CAN. MED. ASS’N J. 1583 (2001). 
 207. OFFICE OF MED. ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS, OR. DEP’T OF HUMAN SERVS., OREGON HEALTH 
PLAN: A HISTORICAL OVERVIEW 1 (2006), available at http://www.oregon.gov/DHS/healthplan/ 
data_pubs/ohpoverview0706.pdf. 
 208. Id. 
 209. Id. at 2. 
 210. Id. at 4. 
 211. Oberlander et al., supra note 206, at 1586. 
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studies.  The Commission’s list, and the subsequent limitations on care 
provided to Oregon Medicaid recipients, has led to substantial 
controversy on a number of occasions since the first list was 
implemented in 1993, and yet the system is still intact.  For example, the 
list specifically does not cover diagnostic or curative care for patients 
who have a 5% or less chance of survival for five years (though it covers 
palliative care).212  This means that Oregon does not provide all possible 
treatment choices to people who are dying and have very little chance to 
live, which has attracted intense criticism. 
This exclusion garnered extensive attention during the illness of 
Barbara Wagner.  Wagner, suffering from a recurrence of her lung 
cancer in August 2008, was denied coverage for a cancer treatment 
because it was not included on the list as she had less than a 5% chance 
of surviving for more than five years.  Wagner was offered coverage for 
palliative care, including, by implication, access to physician-assisted 
suicide.213  This struck some as being exceptionally cruel.  The decision 
resulted in immense criticism, particularly on the Internet, where the 
authors of the list were accused of preferring to kill patients rather than 
treating them.214  Shortly after coverage was denied, Wagner received 
the treatment as a donation from the drug manufacturer.215  The 
treatment failed, and Wagner died in October 2008. 
Even in the face of this controversy regarding the Commission’s 
specific choices, the process Oregon uses to determine the health care it 
will cover is tolerated, and perhaps approved of, by its citizens.  In 2008, 
54% of Oregon residents felt that Oregon was doing a good job in 
assuring access to health care, an increase of 11% from 2006.216  There 
is also evidence that promoting healthcare rationing is not harming 
political futures there.  John Kitzhaber, an emergency medicine 
specialist and Oregon state senator in 1987, was the person who 
originally proposed that Oregon ration health care in order to provide 
basic care to more people.  He became Oregon’s governor in 1995, after 
 212. OR. HEALTH SERVS. COMM’N, PRIORITIZED LIST OF HEALTH SERVICES SI-1 (2008), 
available at http://www.oregon.gov/OHPPR/HSC/docs/Jan08Plist_B.pdf. 
 213. Susan Donaldson James, Death Drugs Cause Uproar in Oregon: Terminally Ill Denied 
Drugs for Life, but Can Opt for Suicide, ABCNEWS, Aug. 6, 2008, http://abcnews.go.com/Health/ 
story?id=5517492&page=1. 
 214. Jeffrey Lord, The Ultimate Cost Saver, THE AM. SPECTATOR, Aug. 18, 2009, 
http://spectator.org/archives/2009/08/18/the-ultimate-cost-saver. 
 215. Rick Attig, Sensationalizing a Sad Case Cheats the Public of Sound Debate, THE 
OREGONIAN, Nov. 29, 2008, http://www.oregonlive.com/opinion/index.ssf/2008/11/ 
sensationalizing_a_sad_case_ch.html. 
 216. Press Release, Or. Dep’t of Admin. Servs., State Releases 2008 Population Survey, Feb. 23, 
2009, available at http://www.oregon.gov/DAS/OPB/docs/PopSurv/2008OPS/ 
OPS_2008_Press_Release.pdf. 
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the first Oregon list of covered services had been implemented.  He 
served from 1995 to 2003.217 
V. CHANGING MEDICARE 
This Part contains a proposal for congressional amendment of the 
Medicare Act to allow CMS to explicitly consider cost when making 
NCDs.  This proposal will give CMS both the power to better control 
cost and the obligation to be forthright as it does so.  This change will 
increase transparency, allow for open debate and hopefully lead to a 
more mature, informed process that will ultimately be successful in 
controlling healthcare costs throughout the United States.  CMS and 
Congress have created a process for making NCDs that allows for a high 
degree of public participation.  Cost-based rationing of a new treatment 
should be debated within this existing process, which only requires 
minor changes to ensure that the debate takes place in a timely and 
informed manner. 
A. Changing “Reasonable and Necessary” 
The original Medicare Act requires CMS to make no payment “for 
any expenses which are incurred for items and services which are not 
reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or 
injury.”218  In Hays v. Sibelius, a recent federal appellate decision 
interpreting this language, Judge Tatel, writing for the majority, read this 
language to mean that “reasonable” is used here as a modifier of “items 
and services,” and not of “expenses.”219  This reading is consistent with 
the legislative history of the Medicare Act. 
Consider the following way of changing this language to allow 
Medicare to consider cost: “for any expenses which are unreasonable 
and which are incurred for items and services which are not reasonable 
and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.”  The 
purpose of adding the language “which are unreasonable” as a modifier 
of “expenses” is to allow CMS to make a full inquiry as to the 
 217. See John Kitzhaber, http://www.johnkitzhaber.com/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2010). 
 218. 42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006). 
 219. Hays v. Sebelius, 589 F.3d 1279, 1282–83 (3d Cir. 2009).  This recent appellate decision in 
the DC Circuit analyzes the language of this section of the Medicare Act.  The language of the relevant 
section of the Medicare Act reads: “no payment may be made . . . for any expenses which are incurred 
for items and services . . . which are not reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of 
illness or injury.”  Id. at 1280 (quoting § 1395y(a)(1)(A)).  The Court stated that Congress could have 
inserted the word “and” after “services,” but chose not to, and thus did not have reasonable as a modifier 
of “expenses” but instead as a modifier for “items and services.”  Id. at 1282. 
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reasonableness of an expense in terms of its effect on the cost of 
Medicare, without impairing its ability to consider whether an item or 
treatment is reasonable and necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of 
illness or injury.  It is important to restate that, to some degree, CMS 
already makes the inquiries about reasonable cost envisioned here, and it 
is impossible to imagine a political situation that would not generate 
pressure on it to continue doing so.  The goal of the statutory change is 
to empower CMS to create a more transparent, rational, and fair process. 
The case study in Part II.D of this Article presents an example of how 
the proposed statutory change would alter the NCD process.  Prior to 
CMS issuing a new NCD for implantable cardiac defibrillators (ICD), 
after it received the results of the study calling for an expansion of ICD 
coverage, the worst-case cost scenario for funding this new NCD was an 
initial outlay of $150 billion for Medicare, with annual costs of up to $8 
billion each year thereafter.  Under the proposed Medicare language, this 
great expense would present a question as to whether it was reasonable 
for Medicare to spend this money, even if the ICD was “reasonable and 
necessary for the diagnosis or treatment of illness or injury.”  The 
language does not dictate the answer, but rather, allows for the question 
to be asked openly. 
It has been argued that the word “reasonable” in the current Medicare 
Act should be interpreted to already include what it is reasonable to pay 
for, at least going so far as to allow CMS the right to consider cost 
effectiveness of a new treatment.220  The legislative history discussed in 
Part II makes it clear that Congress did not envision this.  The cost of the 
healthcare system was not a problem in 1965, and as a result, controlling 
cost was not a pressing concern that needed to be considered in 
Medicare’s language.  Furthermore, it was an anathema to the medical 
establishment to give the federal government the power to determine 
cost-worthiness of physician-prescribed treatments.221  It would not have 
supported the law without having its autonomy protected, which is what 
the Medicare Act clearly did.222 
 220. See Michael S. Kolber, Opacity and Cost Effectiveness Analysis in Medicare Coverage 
Decisions: Health Policy Encounters Administrative Law, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 515 (2009) (Kolber 
argues that the language is broad enough to encompass a cost effectiveness analysis).  But see supra Part 
II; Hays, 589 F.3d at 1282–83 (declining to address the issue of whether CMS may consider cost in its 
coverage decisions, but making clear that coverage and cost are two separate steps of the coverage 
process). 
 221. Supra Part II. 
 222. The language of the law made this position clear.  42 U.S.C. § 1395 (2006) (“Prohibition 
against any Federal interference . . . Nothing in this subchapter [42 U.S.C. § 1395 et seq.] shall be 
construed to authorize any Federal officer or employee to exercise any supervision or control over the 
practice of medicine or the manner in which medical services are provided . . . .”). 
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Even if a strained reading of the language could justify allowing a 
narrow cost effectiveness analysis to be part of an NCD process,223 this 
consideration will be insufficient to solve Medicare’s problems of cost 
and lack of transparency.  Cost effectiveness analysis is not, by itself, 
going to stop out-of-control spending on health care.  Two questions 
remain persistently unanswered with even the best cost effectiveness 
data.  First, when is something effective enough to justify paying for it?  
Second, if inflation of medical costs is controlled, there will be finite 
resources for Medicare.  In the face of finite resources, when are existing 
medical costs important enough to continue funding, rather than shifting 
resources to a new, effective treatment?  The new language proposed 
here is meant to encompass the power to answer both of these questions.  
Furthermore, merely allowing CMS to narrowly consider cost as would 
occur in this scenario does nothing to compel it to disclose when it has 
done so, thus failing to improve transparency.  If there is political 
pressure on CMS to hide its cost-based decision-making from the public, 
only a strong public commitment to transparency will lead to any 
meaningful change. 
B. Changing the NCD Process to Ensure Transparency and Public 
Debate About Cost 
The NCD process was created through a combination of federal law 
and CMS actions.  If Medicare is amended as suggested, minor changes 
need to be made in the federal law governing this process to incorporate 
the new role of cost, and to protect the transparency of any cost-based 
decisions that are made. 
The NCD process is controlled by its own federal law, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395y(l).  The process is exempt from the notice and comment process 
of the Administrative Procedures Act that would ordinarily apply to a 
similar agency undertaking.224  Furthermore, an NCD is not reviewable 
 223. In Kolber’s reading of the Medicare Act, this is as broad a role for cost as he is able to find in 
the language.  While it is debatable as to whether the modern concept of “cost effectiveness,” as 
embodied in the CMS regulations discussed in Part II, even existed in 1965, it may be fair to read 
“reasonable” to include some ability to exclude wasteful procedures from coverage.  The source of the 
Medicare language, however, is the typical health care insurance policy language of 1965, and, as 
described in Part II, there are no contemporaneous judicial interpretations of this contract language that 
support reading this power into this language.  In Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, Eskridge has a 
theory that would allow for a changing interpretation of a durable statute like Medicare, and it is 
persuasive.  Problems of legitimacy and transparency still need to be addressed, and that, in turn, seems 
to call for a more explicit statutory framework for this undertaking than somehow finding that this 
power has developed, organically, in the Medicare Act. 
 224. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395hh(a)(2) (2006); 42 U.S.C. § 1395ff(f)(1)(A) (2006) (exempting the 
NCD process from the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553(b)(3)(A) (2006)). 
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by administrative law judges, who ordinarily have jurisdiction to review 
individual Medicare coverage denials.225 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(l), the language of the first subsection, 
entitled “(1) Factors and evidence used in making national coverage 
determinations,” states: “The Secretary shall make available to the 
public the factors considered in making national coverage 
determinations of whether an item or service is reasonable and 
necessary.”226  Currently, specific factors are not enumerated in this 
subsection.  This language should be changed to compel the disclosure 
of cost concerns, thereby encouraging the transparent process called for 
in this Article, when such concerns are a factor in making an NCD.  The 
first subsection quoted above should be entitled (A) and a new 
subsection (B) should be inserted, stating: “When cost of a proposed 
medical treatment is a factor in making a national coverage 
determination, the Secretary shall, in a timely manner, disclose that this 
factor is being considered, and, after a national coverage determination 
is issued, any effect it had on that determination.” 
Section (l) further delineates certain procedures that must be followed 
when issuing NCDs, including when CMS must explain its reasoning.  
The timing of this process could create barriers to encouraging robust 
public debate about the role cost plays in an NCD.  Subsections 3(A) 
and (B) of Section (l) require that a proposed NCD be made available 
for a public comment period lasting thirty days.227  These comments 
must then be addressed in the final NCD, which must be issued within 
sixty days of the end of the public comment period.228  It is only as CMS 
issues its final decision that Subsection 3(C) requires CMS to “make 
available to the public the clinical evidence and other data used in 
making such a decision when the decision differs from the 
recommendations of the Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee.”229 
Prior to the public comment period, it may be impossible for CMS to 
know exactly how, or if, its NCD will differ from an Advisory 
Committee recommendation.  However, if the recommendation has 
already been issued, CMS should know if it intends to re-examine it.  If 
a factor in considering re-examining a recommendation is cost concerns 
created by the scope of the coverage recommendation, this needs to be 
made clear in the public notice posted about the proposed NCD.  In the 
case study described in Part II of this Article, the NCD for ICDs was 
 225. 42 C.F.R. §§ 405.732, 405.860 (2010). 
 226. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1395y(l)(1) (West 2010). 
 227. § 1395y(l)(B). 
 228. § 1395y(l)(C). 
 229. § 1395y(l)(3)(C)(iii). 
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issued after the Medicare Coverage Advisory Committee recommended 
coverage consistent with the FDA marketing approval, and, 
subsequently, CMS declined to follow this recommendation.  It is likely 
that the difference between the coverage recommended by the Medicare 
Coverage Advisory Committee and the coverage embodied in the NCD 
was substantially influenced by cost concerns.  The change proposed 
here would allow the public to comment on cost concerns created by the 
scope of the recommendation before the final NCD is issued. 
Furthermore, before or as the public comment period begins, the 
public needs access to more information about CMS’s decision-making 
process than may be contained in the text of a proposed NCD.  The 
current language of subsections (3)(A) and (B) call for a public 
comment period that is triggered by publication of a draft of the 
proposed NCD.  This should be amended to include substantive 
guidance for CMS as to the type of information it must release in 
addition to the actual content of the proposed NCD itself so that the 
public can make informed comments in response to the role cost has 
played in the draft NCD. 
The United States has not grappled with open rationing of health care 
in this way, and it would be unrealistic to expect the process to occur 
without error.  It should be expected that mistakes and injustices will 
occur, especially concerning technologies whose future usefulness and 
cost are fluid and difficult to predict.  In anticipation of these problems, 
Congress should require CMS to revisit NCDs when substantial 
evidence of error or injustice is presented.  To some degree, CMS has 
shown itself to be open to this, as can be seen from its willingness to 
modify of its original NCD about ICDs.230 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Nearly a half-century has passed since America created Medicare.  
Since that time, the cost of medical care has emerged as one of the most 
challenging problems facing this nation.  When Medicare was created, it 
was structured to protect the physician’s power to decide what was in 
the best interests of the patient, without regard to the potentially ruinous 
cost to the nation this would create.  The nature and culture of the 
healthcare system has changed dramatically since 1965, yet the 
Medicare Act has remained chained to an outmoded premise that 
aggregate medical costs should not be considered when making 
coverage decisions.  This dangerous statutory prohibition has forced the 
 230. See supra Part II.D. 
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contemporary Medicare program to consider cost as best it can, but in a 
closeted manner, without the benefit of public debate. 
This Article proposed reforming the Medicare Act so that regulators 
are not only empowered but also compelled to consider the cost of new 
medical treatments when they make program-wide coverage decisions, 
and that they be required to disclose how cost factored into these 
decisions.  Consistent with the goals of healthcare reform, these changes 
will allow Medicare to improve the quality of care its recipients receive, 
reduce the out-of-control costs of the program, and increase the public’s 
ability to participate in making these difficult decisions.  These changes 
are likely to be politically difficult to achieve, yet the current healthcare 
crisis and the extraordinary future financial problems require bold 
change. 
The problem of cost does not rest solely within Medicare, and is, 
instead, widespread throughout the healthcare system.  Given the strain 
on resources created by the ever-increasing cost of funding the system, 
how could pressure not be widespread?  In particular, cost creates 
powerful pressure on the legal structures that regulate this industry, a 
pressure that can distort everything from insurance company benefit 
decisions to recommendations regarding preventive testing.  Legal 
scholars need to do more to analyze the effects of this pressure and to 
help devise regulatory structures for the new healthcare laws that will 
enable a more honest, transparent, and effective system.  Cost will not 
disappear, but it needs to be addressed directly.  Precedence for this 
undertaking can be found in the legal literature concerning ERISA 
preemption from the 1990s, where the cost-saving motives of the 
insurance industry were openly discussed.  This discussion contributed 
to widespread legal change, including the creation of external review 
boards and state ombudsman offices as well as the development of 
patient-protecting Department of Labor regulations for employer-based 
health insurance benefit disputes.  The goal could never be forcing third-
party payers to make benefit decisions without an eye on potential costs, 
but rather to enable patients to have access to the rights guaranteed to 
them in coverage contracts and the changes focused on this form of 
empowerment. 
The work of academics searching for the North Star to serve as a 
guide to an ethical, just, and affordable healthcare system is important, 
and it justifiably occupies much energy.  However, the current 
environment is one where incremental change is likely to remain the 
norm, and where problems of cost, access, and quality are unlikely to be 
resolved in one fell swoop.  It is in this non-ideal world that the values 
of transparency, maturity, and honesty need to be defended as these 
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values are constantly threatened by the problem of cost. 
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